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Abstract
It is difficult to fully know the effects a piece of software will have on your computer,
particularly when the software is distributed by an unknown source. The research in this paper focuses
on malware detection, virtualization, and sandbox/honeypot techniques with the goal of improving the
security of installing useful, but unverifiable, software. With a combination of these techniques, it
should be possible to install software in an environment where it cannot harm a machine, but can be
tested to determine its safety. Testing for malware, performance, network connectivity, memory usage,
and interoperability can be accomplished without allowing the program to access the base operating
system of a machine. After the full effects of the software are understood and it is determined to be
safe, it could then be run from, and given access to, the base operating system. This thesis investigates
the feasibility of creating a system to verify the security of unknown software while ensuring it will
have no negative impact on the host machine.
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Introduction
It can be difficult to determine exactly how software will impact your system prior to
installation. Many popular and useful applications are freely available from open source communities
or free downloads, but they do not come with any guarantee that they will not harm your system. It is
also possible that they can contain malware, whether it is there intentionally or not. This paradigm is
not only applicable to software, but also patches, add-ons, and other third party “enhancement”
applications. Many websites have different kinds of embedded media that require various players; it is
difficult to determine if such a player may be malicious before installing it and executing the file.
To gain confidence when installing unknown software, the areas of virtualization, malware
detection, and sandbox testing were thoroughly investigated. These areas offered techniques to evaluate
unknown and unverified software before installing it. Projects such as SpyProxy[6] help to prevent
malicious web sites from installing malware on a user's machine by tunneling the website through a
virtual machine then studying the effects it has on the virtual machine before allowing the host system
to access the website. While SpyProxy uses a remote machine running a virtual machine similar to
your host system to diagnose potentially malicious web sites, projects such as Manitou[1] and
Solitude[5] harness local virtualization techniques to help isolate and diagnose potentially malicious
software. These projects show how virtualization can be used so that software can be installed in a
secure environment, where it cannot harm the host system, so that it can be fully evaluated to determine
its true intent before installing it on the host system. Virtualization has progressed so that it can be
harnessed by home users in an efficient way to provide a useful testbed.
While virtualization has been used extensively to test unknown software, the malware detection
techniques have evolved from initial signature-based techniques. Heuristic techniques are becoming
more feasible at both a host and a network level. Many innovative techniques[2][10][12][15] have
been created to monitor or determine the execution sequence of code to determine if it is malware.
These techniques have proven to have a low false positive rate while maintaining a high degree of
detection accuracy without sacrificing efficiency. To support these new techniques, signature-based
scanning techniques have also improved[9] to detect viruses faster and more effectively than before.
Honeypots have been used to combine virtualization and malware detection to gather useful
statistical information regarding current malware on the local network and capture malicious
binaries.[23] A honeypot is created to look like a tempting target for malware. No legitimate access
should be made to the honeypot, so any access to the honeypot can be defined as malicious. This
distinction makes it very easy to locate malware – anything interacting with the system can be
considered malicious.[24] The intentional vulnerabilities created in a honeypot help to determine what
kinds of malware are circulating through a network. In addition to determining what is attacking a
network, honeypots can collect malware binaries for further analysis.[45] This can be used to
determine if the anti-virus(AV) software used is adequate for the network by scanning the binaries to
see if the AV engine detects them as malware.[46] They can also be analyzed further to see their
impact on the system and their potential payloads. Any unidentified binaries can be sent to AV vendors
to ensure that signatures are quickly created. The honeypot phenomenon has also spurred the creation
of novel malware detection approaches. Combining virtualization for quickly deployable systems
allows for the Virtual Machine(VM) to be monitored directly through the Virtual Machine
Monitor(VMM).[52] This allows for kernel level trapping and event handling to yield fine-grain
controls over malware.
Combining new malware detection strategies, virtualization techniques, and honeypot and
sandbox technologies can lead to novel security designs based on the interface being secured. Effective
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security strategies can be developed based on the specific interfaces they are securing because the
attack surface is well known. Instead of trying to make a general security system that covers every
attack vector of a computer, a modular security system with differing design requirements based on the
interface could achieve successful computer security.
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Review of the Literature
The classical technique of malware detection is to use signature-based algorithms. These
attempt to identify a unique character sequence in malware, then scan the computer for that unique
sequence. If it is found, it is determined to be malware. Smobile Systems[9] worked on a method to
make signature-based scanning fast and accurate enough to work on mobile devices. A signature-cut
method was used to find the smallest substring of a signature to use as a filter-hash. This filter-hash
was more effective than scanning for the entire signature and eliminates legitimate files from further
scrutiny. If the filter-hash finds a match, the full signature-based hash process is used to determine if it
is malware or not. By using a filter-hash, they eliminated the overhead of checking each signature
against every potential piece of malware. Heuristic detection is another malware detection technique
that has received much research. A heuristic technique monitors the variables of a computer system
long enough that it can draw a statistical baseline for any given time and day. This information is used
to create a model of what normal working conditions are. If the current conditions stray far enough
from this model, then the system needs to be checked for compromise. Heuristic techniques take
advantage of probabilistic models.[11] The threshold of malware detection can be adjusted by the
administrator to be more or less sensitive. The further a monitored system deviates from the statistical
average, the more probable it is that malware is present on the system. Due to heuristic systems being
probability-based, their rate of false positives are higher than other malware detection techniques. A
false positive occurs when the system detects an abnormality as malware, but in actuality that
abnormality is caused by a legitimate source.
Instead of scanning or monitoring for problems, the Intelligent Malware Detection System[10]
(IMDS) parses binaries to determine if their execution would be malicious. An accurate assumption
was made that the executable properties of malware and legitimate software are measurably different.
In order for malware to compromise a system, a vulnerability must be exploited, usually involving
spawning new processes and hooking in to other modules. Depending on the point of execution,
elevation of privileges can also be detected. The IMDS looks at Windows PE executables – they are
formatted to be run on any Windows platform and are an attractive format for malware creators due to
their interoperability. The IMDS parses the binary and generates a database of the execution sequence.
This database is then data mined and compared to legitimate software to determine if the execution
sequence is legitimate or not. The API calls of malicious and legitimate software differed enough that
IMDS was able to accurately detect 92% of unknown malware and all known malware. The next
closest malware detection solutions tested were McAfee and Kaspersky, which only detected 75.3%
and 78% of malware respectively.
Virtualization has created a new platform that can be accessed for malware detection. A virtual
machine (VM) offers many advantages to malware detection. Running a VM on a host allows malware
detection software to have a kernel-like view of the host operating system. This allows for semantic
view reconstruction[2] that avoids distortion from rootkits. In order for the VM to work properly, all
contents need to be stored in some manner on the host machine. These contents are then reconstructed
to create a virtual environment. A malware detection system on the host machine could reconstruct the
data the same way the virtual machine would to have unfiltered access to any of the machines data.
This has an advantage over looking at sensitive areas from within the VM because nothing within the
VM can alter the semantic view. In addition to accurate semantic view reconstruction, virtualization
offers an environment where software can be tested without harming the host machine. If a VM is
compromised, it can be taken down and set back to its original state. The SpyProxy[6] project takes
advantage of this capability by tasking a VM to examine the flow of data between a user's web browser
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and the web server. When a web page is accessed, the cache is checked to see if the page has already
been accessed. If it has not been loaded, and contains more than standard HTML code, the web page is
loaded into a VM. The VM is then monitored for any events that would indicate malicious behavior
from the web server. Any request to download additional software is granted so that it can be tested as
well. The web pages are examined from their root directory down to ensure safety. If no alerts are
triggered, the web page is then sent to the user; if anything malicious occurs, access to the page is
denied.
The use of virtualization for malware detection allows for semantic view reconstruction and
interesting testbed experiments, but also creates a platform for controlled program execution. Some
virtualization techniques accomplish virtualization by implementing a layer between the virtualized
system and the host machine. This layer intercepts system calls between the virtual and host layers;
they are interpreted going both ways so that either layer can understand the other. This additional layer
can be modified to examine system calls before passing them on to the host machine to be
implemented. The Manitou[1] project controls program execution in a virtualization environment by
controlling the paged memory and per-page executable and writable bits. Before an instruction is
executed, it must pass through Manitou. If Manitou does not want the instruction to be executed, it
disables the execution bit of the request. This causes a page fault to occur that is returned to, and dealt
with, in the virtualization layer. This generally causes the program to crash or be aborted. This process
allows Manitou to monitor different processes and control what is permitted to execute. Even if
malware was to compromise a machine, Manitou could be used to disable execution privileges so that
it could not do any harm.
Instead of taking advantage of virtualization by implementing execution controls in a layer
below the virtualized environment, Solitude[5] uses an isolation file system (IFS). The IFS can be
generated on demand based on the needs of the user. When an application is committed to an IFS,
everything is done within that virtualized file system. The application cannot interact with things
outside of its own IFS. More than one application can be joined in a single IFS if they need to interact
with each other. There are also write methods created so that data from the IFS can be written directly
to the host's hard drive. These methods allow for information to pass through the IFS in a usercontrolled manner in the event that it needs to be shared or has been verified in some manner. If
something within an IFS is considered problematic, the IFS can be removed and everything within that
IFS will be removed as if it had never existed on the computer. If malware were to spread from an
application in the IFS all of the writes the malware executed would be contained within the IFS, so
when the IFS was removed, all traces of the malware would also be removed.
A honeypot can combine virtualization and malware detection to allow malware to attack a
vulnerable emulated environment. The malware detection system can detect the attack and collect data
to further benefit the malware detection system or the community the honeypot was deployed in.
Honeypots allow for the collection of real-time statistical information regarding the network - where
attacks are coming from, what services are being targeted, and what types of payloads are being
delivered. For purposes of software verification, honeypots offer valuable insight because they allow
an attack to occur, but closely monitor and contain the attack. Sensors[52] can be placed in the Virtual
Machine Monitor[52] (VMM) that monitor the events of the virtual environment for malicious
behavior. The VMM is a layer between the virtualized environment and the host operating system.
This gives it insight into the virtualization environment. Much malware has similar attacks, such as
forking a new process and loading a malicious service. Traps can be placed at these critical areas to
trigger an event handler. For example, a trap could be placed in the exec() process that triggers an
event handler to look at the process being creating before allowing it to be spawned. The trap and
associated event handler is a sensor. More specific malware can also be detected by placing sensors in
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rarely accessed areas that the malware depend on. This does not increase computational overhead
significantly because the traps are not accessed very often. However, it is very useful for detecting
malware because the semantic view of the virtual environment can be examined before any further
execution is permitted. The event handlers can be used to trigger warnings, stop execution, or add
dynamic traps in other places for further analysis.
The Nepenthes[45] honeypot is a hybrid approach to honeypot technology. Instead of using a
purely high or low interaction design, it uses a customizable modular design. This allows for
vulnerable services to be emulated in a controlled manner. A service could be emulated in a very vague
way until something tries to communicate with it. It can then modify itself based on the needs of the
network communication. For example, a general FTP service could be emulated, then based on the
network interaction, it could respond as a Win32 protocol or a Unix based protocol. The modular
design allows for the creation of different emulation environments. Various services can be emulated
based on the needs of the user. This can be applied to software verification by emulating the type of
environment an application is trying to access. The vulnerabilities can be included in the emulated
environment in a way that triggers alarms if they are taken advantage of. If the software tries to
manipulate the environment in a malicious way, it can be classified as malware without giving it access
to the host operating system, and a low amount of resource usage in the emulation environment is
maintained. The ability to create customized modular emulation environments to mimic a desired
vulnerability allows for the Nepenthes honeypot to remain efficient, useful, and scalable.
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Malware
Malware Defined
Malware is any piece of software that affects your computer in a non-consensual way. This can
range from viruses that negatively impact your computer to adware that impacts your computer only
with minimal unwanted resource usage. The intent of the software is also taken into consideration
when determining if it is malware. For instance, consensual software with the intent of doing one thing
that behaves irregularly and accidentally does damage to the computer is not considered malware. A
piece of defective software that contains harmful bugs is not considered malware if the software's usage
is for legitimate, agreed upon reasons. [13]
Types of Malware
Malware can be classified in many different ways, including, but not limited to, propagation
techniques, payloads, in-memory locations, or infection strategies. It is difficult to create well-defined
categories for malware because the programs often overlap, and some pieces of malware can fall into
more than one category, or define a new subcategory. Regardless of the problems, it is still useful to
create a nomenclature for malware so that professionals can communicate about and discuss pieces
without having to describe every characteristic of every piece of malware. In Peter Szor's book “The
Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense”[16] the following well-known and accepted malware
categories are discussed.
Viruses
A virus is the most commonly misused malware category. Many people refer to any piece of
malware as a virus. However, a virus is specifically any code that replicates itself. A virus does not
execute itself until the program that it has infected is executed.[27] This leads to viruses targeting
executable files. Depending on the virus, it can evolve when replicating to create new generations of
itself. It can infect host files or other areas of the system. It is also possible for a virus to modify
existing references to objects in order to take control of them, and then multiply again. The goal of a
virus is to infect a system, which can have destructive or irreparable effects on the system.
An early virus known as the Jerusalem virus (Jerusalem.B) was detected in 1991.[27] It is a
good example of the destructive nature of a virus. It infected any file with an exe, sys, and com
extension. As the files were infected and ran, they increased in size as a result of the virus. When the
system clock turned to Friday 13th, the virus deleted all files on the computer. A virus can harm a
computer but it does not have any financial benefit to the creator. As shown in Figure 1, viruses have
been declining as more lucrative types of malware are focused on. Currently, Panda Security[28] finds
that viruses only make up 11.37% of malware traffic.
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Figure 1: The number of viruses seen each year. [27]
Worms
A worm is a virus on the network level. Instead of replicating itself on an isolated machine, it
replicates itself over a network. A worm can automatically execute itself in a manner to move from
system to system, or wait for a user-initiated method of replication. An example of a worm is the
mass-mailer type. It propagates through a user's email, sending itself to anyone accessible via the
email system. The W32/MSNBot.D.worm worm was detected on September 9, 2008.[30] It spreads to
users via e-mail through a file with a butterfly icon. Once a system is infected, it gathers personal
information about the user such as user names and passwords. Unlike a virus, a worm is a standalone
executable instead of a piece of code embedded within a file. Worms have evolved from being used by
malware creators to gain notoriety to being used for financial gain. Of worms detected in 2007,
34.96% of them were used to create botnets.[29] A botnet is a collection of compromised computers
that can be accessed for malicious use by an attacker. These computers have been previously
compromised and left in a state that allows an attacker to control them remotely.
There are many subcategories of worms, like the mass-mailer previously discussed. Another
subcategory is the octopus. An octopus is a type of worm that exists as different pieces on more than
one machine. One function might be on one computer, while other functions are on various other
computers in a network. The total functionality of the worm is not realized until they all communicate
with each other and harness the capabilities of the separate pieces working together. An octopus could
be utilized to perform larger operations that might be more noticeable if done on one isolated machine.
This is not a common piece of malware, but it is expected to be used more in the future. A rabbit can
be used to refer to a worm that exists as one single copy at a time. It jumps from one computer to
another as it executes its payload then leaves. Some researchers use “rabbit” to refer to a piece of
malware that quickly replicates itself until the CPU load has increased to a state that can crash
programs not made to run in environments with a heavy CPU load.
Logic Bombs
A logic bomb is a piece of malicious code that is intentionally hidden within a legitimate
program. These occur on large projects where code reviews cannot be adequately done. For example,
a program might be designed to delete itself after being used X number of times. Before deletion, it
could slip a piece of code in to the system with malicious intent. Roger Duronio[32] was charged with
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using a logic bomb against his former company UBS[33] in June 2006. He was convicted and
sentenced to 8 years and 1 month in prison, and $3.1 million in restitution to UBS. Logic bombs are
related to Easter Eggs – pieces of code slipped in with no malicious purpose. These can be pieces of
code that give credit to people that helped develop the software, or just something special that the
designers wanted to insert. For example, Microsoft's Excel 97 had a built-in flight simulator[31] that is
not advertised and can only be accessed through a specific sequence of keystrokes.
In order for a piece of software to be considered a logic bomb, it has to be unwanted and
unknown to the user. This means that a known functionality built in to a program that intentionally
limits usability or removes itself after a trial period is over is not considered a logic bomb. The payload
of a logic bomb is only executed when specific conditions are met at a specific time. They generally
delete or corrupt data, print a specific message, or have other unwanted effects.[14] It is possible that a
logic bomb will not be discovered or ever used if certain conditions do not occur.
Trojan Horses
A piece of software that convinces a user to run it due to some appealing characteristics, but has
malicious consequences, is considered a Trojan. There are two distinct kinds of Trojans with a few
subcategories. The first is a complete 100% Trojan. It might be named differently, or packaged and
advertised differently, but there is nothing in it other than the malicious code. The second kind of
Trojan is a modification of a legitimate piece of software. It still maintains some or all of the
functionality as the advertised piece of software, but in addition it executes the piece of malicious code.
The goal of a Trojan is to install unwanted software on a computer so that it can be remotely accessed
and controlled without the user's consent. Trojans have become more lucrative because now they are
often designed specifically to steal banking information. The use of Trojans has increased significantly.
Figure 2 shows the increase in Trojans seen at PandaLabs[34]. In 2007, 70% of malware seen at the
laboratory were Trojans.

Figure 2: The percentage of Trojans seen at PandaLabs.[34]
A subcategory of a Trojan is a rootkit. A rootkit is a program that mimics the functionality of a
legitimate program with some other malicious intention. For example, by modifying the “ps”
command on a Linux system (a command that shows running processes) to hide specific processes
while displaying the remaining processes, a rootkit could hide evidence of itself and other pieces of
malware.
In addition to the rootkits, password-stealing Trojans are another subcategory of Trojans. They
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reside on the infected machine waiting for passwords to be entered. When they are, the password is
sent to the attacker so that he/she can have “legitimate” access to what the user is logging into. These
are often accompanied by keyloggers so that each keystroke can be recorded. The Lydra.AO
Trojan[51] was detected on October 5, 2008. It contains a keylogger to steal people's account and
password information. In addition to having a keylogger, it gets information from the computer such as
the computer name, IP information, and operating system version. This information is then sent back
to the author.
Another type of Trojan is a backdoor. A backdoor is an application that opens a network port so
that a remote connection can be made to the system. The hacker that created the Trojan can then access
the infected machine at any time. This can be combined with rootkits to hide the backdoor from the
user so that no suspicions are raised. An example of a backdoor Trojan is Redvoz.A.[50] is an
example. It was first detected on October 1, 2008. It installs itself on a compromised machine then
connects to a server. An attacker can then connect to the server and remotely control the machine. A
backdoor can also be built into an application intentionally. Some programs create backdoors for
troubleshooting purposes. Many of these are not meant to go live to the public, and some are not meant
to be discovered, but they become problematic when they are.
Exploits
Exploit code is created to target a specific vulnerability. It can be executed locally or remotely
on the target depending on the targeted vulnerability. Exploit code is not always malicious. A “white
hat” hacker can create exploit code to do legitimate penetration testing. In this respect, the severity of
the exploit can vary depending on the intentions of the attacker. Exploit code is used to break into
specific programs or systems to gain information or elevate privileges. It is also sometimes traded
amongst both penetration testers and hackers.
Many exploits have been produced for Microsoft applications[35][36][37][38]. Four different
exploits were discovered at PandaLabs on September 10, 2008. The MS08-055 exploit[35] takes
advantage of uniquely crafted URLs that reference OneNote files. If the exploit is successful, it gives
the attacker access to the computer with the access privileges of the currently logged-on user. The
MS08-054 exploit[36] gives control of the user's computer to an attacker through a vulnerability found
in Windows Media Player Version 11. A link to a maliciously created audio file executes the exploit.
The MS08-053 exploit[37] gives an attacker remote control of the computer with the currently loggedon user's rights by exploiting a vulnerability in Windows Media Encoder 9. The MS08-052 exploit[38]
uses a vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows graphics device interface (GDI) to give an attacker
remote control of the computer with the privileges of the logged-on user.
Kits (Virus Generators)
A kit is a program used to create viruses automatically based on the decisions the user has
made. They are usually menu driven so that very little background knowledge is needed. Instead, the
user selects the specific kind of attack and potential targets; then, the virus is automatically created.
Most often, these are faulty or unsuccessful viruses. However, occasionally a virus is generated that
works and is quite destructive.
A kit that generates malware does not have to be used exclusively to create viruses.
YTFakeCreator[18] is a hacking tool that was first detected on September 5, 2008. It is used to create
fake YouTube pages that people can then use for other attacks. This can be coupled with any type of
malware; YTFakeCreator only facilitates the delivery of the malware. When a website created by this
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tool is accessed, it looks like a real YouTube website, but an error is displayed. The error can be
customized using the tool. If the error message link is followed, then the malware specified by the
creator of the site can be downloaded to the host system. If coupled with another tool that creates
malware, a malicious user without any knowledge of malware creation or computer security can gain
access to a delivery mechanism and cause the malware to be delivered.
Spammer Programs
The main purpose of spammer programs is to generate incoming traffic to a particular website.
They are normally used for advertisement purposes; they target mobile devices through e-mail,
newsgroups, or even text messages on cell phones with messages regarding the website they are
advertising. Another purpose of a spammer program is a phishing attack. The attacker might send a
message saying that you need to visit a particular login site, and a link is supplied. The link then goes
to a duplicate fraudulent site that is made to look like the original. If any personal information is put in,
it is then given to the attacker. This technique can be used for identity theft.
The Spammer.AJR[56] malware was detected on October 12, 2008. The malware sends a
message to a user advertising rogue anti-malware software. A link to a website imitating YouTube[57]
is given in the message. If the link is followed, adware is downloaded to the user's computer. This
adware warns of malware on the computer and advertises different anti-malware solutions. The antimalware solutions do not provide any useful service, and are not free of charge.
Keyloggers
A keylogger simply logs the keystrokes inputted into a compromised system. Everything typed
by the user is stored so that the attacker can see everything that he/she types. This often includes user
names and passwords, I.D. Information, social security numbers, or credit card information. This is
another piece of malware used for identity theft. A keylogger could also be combined with a rootkit so
that the compromised system does not show any signs of being compromised, and the attacker's
method of transferring the keystrokes back can be hidden.
Keyloggers can be categorized differently depending on the attack type. For example, McAfee
classifies Keylogger.c as a Trojan with a subtype of keylogger[39]. Keylogger.c captures a user's
keystrokes then mails them back to a configured e-mail address using its own SMTP engine.
Hacktool.Keylogger was identified by Symantec on February 13, 2007[40]. It is a keylogger with a
defined method of transmission of “...can be installed as part of a threat, such as a Trojan horse.” A
keylogger can be bundled with various kinds of malware, or use different kinds of malware, to be
installed on a machine. Once installed, they all act the same by logging a user's input in a manner that
the attacker can later use it.
Adware and Spyware
Adware and spyware are software installed on a computer system with the intention of
monitoring the user's habits and reporting them back to the company that installed them. They usually
do not have any direct malicious intent. However, they can lower security settings on web browsers so
that the system becomes more vulnerable to other pieces of malware. Often, these programs are not
effectively built and use a lot of resources, negatively impacting system performance. Adware and
Spyware make up an unusual group; it is debatable whether they are even considered malware, since
there is no malicious intent. There is conflict about their classification and removal. Many companies
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use adware or spyware for directed advertising, and would likely see reduced revenues if they were no
longer legal.
The VirusResponseLab2009[41] adware is an example of adware that does not directly harm the
computer, but does harm the user. The adware displays screens to the user warning them of threats that
do not exist on their computer. To resolve these threats, the user is instructed to purchase and
download the antivirus software from their website. After it has been purchased, it displays a user
interface with fake information and pops up windows displaying fake attacks at random times. The
adware does not do anything to the computer aside from installing itself, but it does trick the consumer
in to paying for software that does nothing useful. This type of malware has been called
“scareware.”[42] A scareware vendor based out of Texas was sued in October 2008 under
Washington's Computer Spyware Act. The act “...punishes individuals who prey on user concerns
regarding spyware or other threats. Specifically, the law makes it illegal to misrepresent the extent to
which software is required for computer security or privacy, and it provides actual damages or statutory
damages of $100,000 per violation, whichever is greater.”[43] Bruce Schneier, “an internationally
renowned security technologist”, has promoted the lawsuit as “a good thing.”[44]
Current Malware Trends and Statistics
Vulnerabilities
Malware has traditionally targeted vulnerabilities in a specific host operating system. At one
point, a large portion of the population could be found using the same operating system, so it offered a
wide attack vector. In order to deliver their malware to the broadest range of people, malware creators
targeted the most common base operating systems (generally Microsoft Windows). This has begun to
change in the last few years. As operating system usage begins to diversify, it is becoming less
effective to write malware for one specific operating system. Instead, malware creators are targeting
applications. The year 2007[22] saw a significant increase in vulnerabilities of browsers, office
applications, audio and video multimedia players, pdf readers, antivirus products, and compression
applications.
Many of the new application-specific vulnerabilities require some sort of interaction from the
user. This can be anything from opening an e-mail or attachment to visiting a particular website. The
use of social engineering attacks has increased to get the user to take the actions required by the
malware developers to infect the host system.
Microsoft Office applications were frequently targeted in 2007[22]. Severe vulnerabilities were
found for many of the applications, including Outlook, Word, PowerPoint, Excel, Visio, FrontPage and
Access. It is a widely-known fact that Microsoft updates their software every second Tuesday of the
month. Exceptions might occur when more critical updates are pushed earlier than expected. Malware
developers take advantage of this by releasing their malware on the Wednesday after release so they
will have maximum impact. This predictable schedule makes Microsoft applications a more tempting
target when considering how many people use the programs.
The corporate climate has changed considerably with the increasing use of the Internet. Now,
nearly every employee can have access to the Internet to browse from time to time. It was once
possible to offer adequate protection by securing DNS, mail, and web services and putting up edge
network security solutions like firewalls. However, with the extensive amount of traffic a corporation
can generate, this is no longer sufficient. Recent trends are showing that browsers are a focal point of
hackers[22]. While blocking content from untrusted sites prevents a large amount of malware, the
number of infected trusted sites has been increasing. In 2007, it was found that embassies, banks,
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online stores, and ISPs had trusted sites that had been infected to deliver malware to the people visiting
them. As with browsers, multimedia applications are, by default, installed on many different operating
systems (Windows, OS X, Linux, Unix, etc.) and offer a large client base for attack. These
vulnerabilities are often executed by enticing the user to open a multimedia file through email or other
advertisements. These files will then install the particular piece of malware on the system, leaving it
vulnerable to the attacker. Often, they do play some sort of media so that the person being attacked
does not realize that something unwanted is going on on their machine.
Current Trends
The most recent documented trends from April to June 2008 [21] show a significant increase in
the use of Trojans and the infection of trusted sites to deliver malware. Instead of using attentiongrabbing techniques that are very easy to detect, many pieces of malware aim to work silently without
the notice of the user. Trojans work perfectly to accomplish this task. A large increase in the use of
Trojans has been to steal banking information. There has been a 400% increase in the use of Trojans to
steal banking information in the year 2007. The most active families have been Brazilian banker
Trojans and Russian banker Trojans (1.0 and 2.0). The Brazilian bank Trojans (Banbra, Bancos) are
designed to steal passwords primarily from Brazilian and Portuguese banks (and less frequently
Spanish banks) then transmit the information through FTP or email. The Banbra family of Trojans is
created with Delphi, while Bancos is created with Visual Basic. Instead of the normal kit-developed
Trojans, these were each created individually. The Russian banker Trojans, on the other hand, are
largely created using Trojan kits. Because the core remains the same, many functions have not
changed, making them easier to detect. The Russian banker Trojans 2.0 family (Sinowal, Torpig,
Bankolimb) is more dangerous because they are updated more often. This family has one distinct
characteristic in common. The banking information targeted is given to the malware through a
configuration file. This particular functionality is easier to locate, but it is also much easier to modify
the target since the malware itself does not need to be modified, only the configuration file. They also
employ polymorphic and stealth techniques to try and make detection more difficult.
The use of botnets and zombie networks to spread spam has also been increasing. During the
first months of 2008, it was estimated that between 60 and 94 percent of all emails sent were spam.[21]
The United States is currently the largest producer of spam emails, responsible for 34.21% of all spam.
Another avenue of attack has been recently added to the spammers; social networks are now being
targeted. At the beginning of the year, spam images were beginning to appear on the Flickr network.
The Twitter network has also seen an increase in spam. Various advertisers have created identities and
asked to be added to a profile. The advertised product can usually be found in the name, and the
information in the profile contains nothing but advertisements.
With the increase of spam, an increase in phishing attacks has also been noted. Increasingly
advanced techniques improve both content and detection evasion capabilities and allow spam and
phishing emails to get through. Phishing kits are also improving. Web page templates of any major
bank or organization can be found in a phishing kit, so that someone wanting to perform an attack does
not need knowledge of how to create one. With the abundance of freely hosted web servers and email
accounts, it is now possible to perform lucrative phishing attacks with no upfront knowledge or
investment. Easy creation and high profit margin of these attacks means they will likely increase in the
future.
The number of computers that have been made part of zombie networks or botnets has also
been increasing. The Shadowserver Foundation[19] attempts to track the use of zombie networks and
botnets. An infected system communicates with a Command and Control (C&C) server to receive its
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orders and attack instructions. Tracking the C&C servers and what machines communicate with them
gives an estimate of currently active zombie networks. If a C&C goes down, the associated bots with
that server are removed from the count. In addition, entropy values are put in place to keep from
inflating the numbers by counting inactive machines. The Shadowserver Foundation has seen an
increase from 100,000 to 450,000[20] in machines that were part of a botnet from June 2008 to August
2008.
Initial reports from the third quarter of 2008 (July – September) show an increase in Adware.
As Figure 3 demonstrates, Trojans still represent the largest segment of newly detected malware.
However, the increasing amount of fake anti-virus programs has caused the percentage of Adware to
increase from 22.03% in the second quarter to 37.49% in the third quarter.

Figure 3: Left: Distribution of new malware detected by PandaLabs in the third quarter of 2008 based
on malware type. Right: Distribution of malware detections made by PandaLabs sensors in the third
quarter of 2008.[53]
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Virtualization
Types of Virtualization
Virtualization is used to abstractly represent computer resources so that a type of virtualized
system can take advantage of them. There are over a dozen types of virtualization, ranging from full
platform virtualization to something as commonly used as the Redundant Array of Independent Disks
(RAID). For the purposes of this research, the types of virtualization examined will be those currently
used for malware research, or types that may help to facilitate malware research in the future.
Platform Virtualization
Platform virtualization is performed on a given hardware platform by the host software on the
system. A virtual computer environment (virtual machine) is created for the guest software, possibly an
application or an entire operating system, to be run in. There are generally no requirements that the
software being run in the virtual machine be compatible with the software outside of the virtual
machine. The guest application will normally need access to the hardware of the system. This is
accomplished by allowing the guest system to interface with the virtual machines hardware as if it was
directly accessing the actual machine's hardware. In full virtualization, the virtual machine supports
the hardware so that the guest application can operate normally as if it were installed natively; no
modifications are needed to get it working properly. Hardware-assisted virtualization allows for the
application to be run in the same manner, but the hardware has specific built-in features that facilitate
the use of virtualization. It can be used to ensure that the guest applications are run in complete
isolation. Paravirtualization does not allow the guest application to be run unmodified. Instead, a layer
is added between the guest application and the host system (such as the Hypervisor). The guest
application then has to be modified to use the API established by the new layer. System calls are made
to the virtualization layer instead of the host system, and these can differ depending on the API used.
Application Virtualization
Normally, platform virtualization is used for entire operating systems. That is why much effort
is put in to adding support for various hardware architectures and system calls of different operating
systems. Application virtualization is not capable of supporting an operating system, but is meant for
single applications. In effect, application virtualization tricks the application into thinking it has been
installed directly on the system, when actually it has been encapsulated in some manner, preventing it
from being installed directly on the hardware. This is accomplished by adding a virtualization layer
between the application to be installed and the underlying hardware, similar to paravirtualization, but
on a different scale. When the application makes a call to anywhere outside of what has already been
loaded for the application, it is intercepted by the virtualization layer and the call is redirected to a
virtualized location. Any call to the disk, registry, or any other piece of hardware is instead sent to an
area maintained by the virtualization layer so that the user can control what is accessed and how the
accessed data is maintained. Instead of virtualizing the hardware so that an operating system can
access it, application virtualization virtualizes aspects of the operating system so that can applications
can access the operating system in a manner that is controlled by the user.
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Benefits of Virtualization
At a corporate level, malware is an expensive problem. It can lead to time loss due to computer
inefficiencies, data loss, or even hardware corruption that necessitates the need to buy a new system
altogether, often losing many irreplaceable components (dated software, for example). Malware
detection that takes advantage of virtualization could benefit a home user as well. The user can test
whether or not a piece of software is malware by installing it in a manner that isolates it so that it can
be tested before allowing it to interact with the actual system. This could help to determine the
negative consequences of software that has not been thoroughly tested, whether the consequences are
intentional or not.
Cost Benefits
The consumer cost benefits of using virtualization are clear. The cost of time to repair a system
after the malware has delivered its payload, the cost of replacing any hardware or software, and any
personal costs incurred are avoided if the malware can be detected before it is permitted to harm the
system. There is additional cost benefit for using application testing. A system that verifies software
through virtualization can be used for more than detecting malware. Program interoperability, system
utilizations, memory costs, and many other facets of the software can be tested in addition to the
presence of malware. This means that various programs can be thoroughly tested by a third party
application instead of needing to be scrutinized by the user. This is particularly beneficial for freeware,
where there are many different open source solutions to the same problem, but determining which one
is best for the user can be difficult. This is all possible because the home user does not have to meet
any special or additional hardware requirements in order to test the software. Virtualization allows any
other program to run on the same machine without buying a new system to test with. This can be
extended to the corporate level. Many corporations make use of testbeds for large applications. While
this would likely still be necessary, the time invested on the testbed and hardware usage could be
minimized by testing single computer applications in a virtualized environment. A single application is
not the only thing that can be tested or implemented virtually. More than one system could be
virtualized, or even an entire network. Then, the interaction of various computers over a network can
also be monitored to see impacts on issues such as bandwidth. Unnecessary hardware costs can also be
removed by creating an environment where hardware will not be damaged during application testing.
There is also a measurable benefit to corporations utilizing virtualization due to the reduction in
power requirements.[17] Condensing several physical servers down to one physical machine with
several virtual machines can save thousands of dollars over the course of a year, depending on how
many machines can be reduced. The reduction in systems can be continued further by converting large
servers to smaller virtualized machines and using more efficient data storage techniques such as storage
arrays. It is difficult to measure additional savings such as the reduction in cooling requirements
because they would differ determining on the installation area. However, less cooling would be needed
due to fewer machines in use, lowering the power needs of the cooling system ,and possibly allowing
for a smaller cooling system.
Program Monitoring
With many different software development tools, it is possible to monitor the execution of code
in a line-by-line manner. This allows the programmer to see what exactly is happening at every line of
code. The ability to pause the execution sequence to examine various parameters, or modify various
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parameters, and then continue with execution, is used to determine exactly where particular effects are
occuring. The same capabilities can be used in a virtual environment. Instead of looking at each line
of code, an application can be launched in its normal working environment and then monitored to see
exactly what it is doing. This includes the ability to pause the application and look at various
processes, registers, and opened files, or gather state information. This information can then be used to
determine if the program is performing in a manner that is agreeable to the user or not. The working
environment can also be modified to show what kinds of future effects the program might have. For
instance, the current date could be modified to be many years in advance to see if anything unusual
changes with the application (such as a virus with a set time to deliver its payload, or a date
malfunction). Ie essence, the user would be able to see everything that the program would do to his or
her computer without the program actually having access to their system.
Performance Isolation
Depending on the technique, using virtualization to aid in malware detection is only a
reasonable strategy if the use of virtualization allows the user to continue using the system for his or
her normal activities. To this end, it is important to determine the impact that virtualization would have
if it were hosted on the user's own computer instead of on a remote system[8].
In order to examine the performance isolation capabilities of virtualization, many different types
of virtualization (full virtualization, paravirtualization, and operating system level virtualization) were
tested to see how applying stress in the virtual environment affected the performance outside of the
virtual machine.[8] In total, 6 tests were run on each virtualization environment:
1. Memory Intensive – loops constantly allocating and touching memory without freeing it
2. Fork Bomb – loops creating new child processes
3. CPU Intensive – tight loop containing integer arithmetic operations
4. Disk Intensive – running 10 threads of Iozone, each running an alternating read and write
pattern
5. Network Intensive (Transmit) – 4 threads each constantly sending 60K sized packets over UDP
6. Network Intensive (Receive) – 4 threads each constantly reading 60K sized packets over UDP
These tests were all performed on the various virtualization environments: Vmware Workstation (full
virtualization), Xen (paravirtualization), Solaris Containers and OpenVZ (operating system level
virtualization). To test the performance isolation properties, SPECweb (SNMP based) was used to
report metrics of interest. Each virtual machine then had an Apache web server configured to report on
the requested metrics. When performing the stress tests, a Virtual Machine (VM) was put under one of
the above tests (the “misbehaving” machine) while the others remained under normal conditions. The
results of the misbehaving machine and all other VMs were then compared to the baseline of all of the
VMs working without one of them misbehaving.
The results showed that even when one of the virtual machines was misbehaving, the other VMs
did not suffer a significant performance loss. The virtualization technologies add a layer between the
VMs and the operating systems that is capable of isolating the virtual machines. This also controls the
amount of resources used so that one VM can not consume all of the resources and cause the others to
become unresponsive or unstable. This throttling results in the other VMs operating normally, but it
causes the VM that is working rigorously to suffer severe performance losses.
Software Efficiency
Different types of virtualization require varying degrees of resource management and
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utilization, processor and memory utilization, and resource usage. To ensure a high degree of isolation,
entire operating systems can be duplicated. When examining potentially harmful code for malware,
software isolation is necessary. However, for it to be feasibly used at a consumer level it needs to be
done without using so many resources that the average computer is not compatible with the software.
The Feather-weight Virtual Machine (FVM)[3] uses namespace virtualization to significantly
cut down on the resources used in the virtualization. The benefit of this approach over others is that it
is also compatible with Windows, and maintains software isolation. Two techniques are used to reduce
the resource cost of virtualization. The first is the use of namespaces. Namespaces are already highly
developed in the Windows environment. When a virtualized resource tries to perform an action, such
as access a file in a particular directory, the namespace is prepended to the directory so the unique
virtual file, which is a copy of the original, is accessed. This same method is used for processes,
memory accesses, hardware interfacing, etc. Everything in a particular VM has its own namespace.
This also allows more than one virtualized resource to operate; each one can have a unique namespace
and thusly unique resource abstraction. The Windows environment ensures that differing namespaces
will maintain isolation so that one VM will not be able to interact with other VMs.
The second technique is the copy on write technique. If the VM is trying to access a resource
with a read-only command, it is not of high concern if that particular resource is shared or copied and
unique to that VMs namespace. In the case that it is going to be modified, it is copied in to that VM's
namespace. This saves time copying unnecessary items (those that are only going to be read from).
The copy on write technique and namespace virtualization are accomplished by intercepting system
calls at the kernel level. This is where the namespace rewriting is done, as well as where the copy on
write decision is made. The FVM and its virtualization layer operate at the kernel level instead of the
user level, making them harder to exploit and easier to maintain separation.
The FVM achieves very efficient virtualization. Tests of the prototype have shown latencies of
creating and starting VMs of less than one second. Run-time virtualization was demonstrated to be less
than 20% of the total execution time of the tested applications. The FVM was created with the purpose
of being resource- and time-efficient, particularly for the use of intrusion and malware detection
systems that need to harness the capabilities of virtualization to do sandbox-like testing.
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Honeypots and Sandboxes
Overview
Honeypots allow for their administrators to monitor current attack trends. In addition to being a
useful tool to gain relevant information regarding malware, honeypots provide a system architecture
that is meant to be exploited but easily recovered from. One of the values of a honeypot is that it can
be exploited to find new types of malware, but it can be taken offline at any time (it is not a production
unit) to be examined to determine the extent of the damage. However, a honeypot also offers an
environment that is intentionally susceptible to malware, but made specifically to not redistribute
malware. This offers a relevant environment to study to aid in creating a system that can efficiently
detect malware while remaining resistant to being compromised. In the event the system is
compromised, it is set up to be easily recovered while maintaining enough integrity that malware is not
redistributed and no useful information is returned to the attacker.
A honeypot is a system that is never intended to be legitimately accessed[23]. Anything
interacting with a honeypot can be considered unauthorized. This helps in forensic examinations of
honeypots because there are no false positives. A honeypot can be used in a production setting, or a
research setting, or a combination of the two. In a production setting, the honeypot mirrors the actual
system that the company is running. Honeypots are highly monitored, so that they can be examined at
any time to determine who is trying to access them, what they are doing, and how they are doing it.
The security levels of a production honeypot mimic those of the actual network so that information
gained regarding attacks on the honeypot can be applied to the actual network. When an exploit is used
on the honeypot, it is reported to the administrators so that the vulnerability can be addressed and fixed
on the legitimate machines. They do not work very well as decoys because most attacks are automated
and will be launched on any machines that are found. However, they are useful for finding
vulnerabilities on a system that can be taken down and examined at any time, which is something that
is much harder to do on a working system. The goal is to determine how a honeypot becomes
compromised so that the vulnerability discovered can be fixed on the legitimate system, preventing it
from being compromised by that vulnerability. A research honeypot is deployed to gain more
information about the nature of attackers and malware. Instead of looking for specific vulnerabilities
that need to be addressed in a legitimate system, a research honeypot aims to discover current trends
and attack vectors so that defense mechanisms can remain updated. A research honeypot is generally
monitored more heavily than a production honeypot because the administrators are looking for more
information than what the live machines are vulnerable to. A research honeypot can also determine
where the attacks are coming from, what kinds of tools are being used, or the current trends of
malware. The difference between a production honeypot and a research honeypot is based on how they
are used as opposed to how they are setup or where they are deployed. It is possible for a company to
utilize a honeypot to fulfill both roles.
A second distinction between honeypots[23] is the level of interaction allowed between the
attacker and the honeypot. Low-interaction and medium-interaction honeypots do not have operating
systems installed. Instead, available services are simulated. The degree to which they are simulated
determines if they are low or medium-interaction honeypots. A medium-interaction honeypot will
simulate the services so that the attack can progress through its stages; this allows the honeypot
monitors to gain more information from the attack. Low- and medium-interaction honeypots take less
time to monitor and administer because there is not an operating system that can be taken over and used
against the honeypot administrator. It is critical to ensure that a honeypot is not taken over and used in
a malicious manner. If this were to happen, it could harm the network and the data collected could be
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contaminated and unusable. A high-interaction honeypot has an actual operating system installed and
provides enough services that it can be fully attacked. This allows administrators the ability to collect
detailed information about the attacks, but it is more time-consuming to monitor. The services
provided can fully interact with an attacker up to and, including, being compromised. This leads to
high-interaction honeypots being taken offline for forensic examination more often, or at the least
rebuilt to get rid of the malware that exploited the system.
A sandbox uses some of the same techniques that a honeypot uses. A sandbox is used to allow
questionable or unknown software to execute in a safe environment.[54] A honeypot is made to attract
malware by appearing to be vulnerable to the attackers. This creates an environment where a certain
degree of malware is expected to be executed. A sandbox also allows the execution of malware, but the
environment is more restrictive because the administrator of the sandbox determines what will be
executed, as opposed to a honeypot where anything could be executed. A sandbox can allow a program
to execute in a line by line basis, monitoring exactly what happens at each moment of execution.
Honeynet
A honeynet is an unused network that consists of various honeypots. All traffic to and from a
honeynet is suspect. The honeypots can be different system configurations running various operating
systems. The honeypots in a honeynet are not emulated and are representative of “off the shelf”
production models. They are not secured, but their security is not diminished. A honeynet sits behind a
firewall that archives all network transmissions so that attacks can be analyzed at a network level.
Instead of the firewall protecting the honeynet from the Internet, the firewall protects machines on the
Internet from potentially compromised machines in the honeynet.
The Honeynet Project[24] released a revised set of suggested standards in October, 2004. Three
important definitions and requirements are offered: Data Control, Data Capture, and Data Collection.
Data control ensures that malicious interactions can occur with the honeynet, but the results of any
compromises will not harm non-honeynet systems. Data control takes priority over data capture, and
should not be detectable by the attacker. Data capture captures all inbound and outbound activities to
the honeynet, this is also done in a manner that is undetectable by an attacker. Data collection is done
in a distributed environment when several honeypots are providing data. Data captured is securely
forwarded to a centralized location for analysis and archiving. This is important to insure the integrity
of the data collected and to prevent attackers from viewing the collected data and determining that the
system is a honeypot and not an operational system.
A honeynet is effectively nothing more than a networked set of honeypots. However, it has to
be carefully controlled to collect as much useful information as possible while hiding the fact that it is
not a production system from an attacker. The defining aspect of a honeynet is its architecture[25]. To
ensure data collection, data capture, and data control, an interface is added between the honeynet and
the Internet. This is generally a layer 2 device with no IP information so that it will be hidden from an
attacker. The Honeynet Project refers to this interface as a honeywall. Figure 4, below, shows the
suggested architecture of a honeynet. The honeywall can have an interface with an IP address for
remote administration as long as it is not part of the honeynet. The interface between the router and the
honeywall is bridged, as well as the interface between eth0 and eth1 so that no additional IP
information is provided. The honeywall is responsible for allowing malicious attacks against any
machine in the honeynet and stopping any machine in the honeynet from attacking anything outside of
the network.
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Figure 4: The Honeynet Project's proposed architecture for a honeynet.[25]
To monitor the current activities of the blackhat community, the Irish Honeynet Project[26]
followed the steps initially outlined by the Honeynet Project. Data control is accomplished with a
firewall as the only point of entry and exit to the honeynet, called a honeynet sensor. In order to collect
useful information regarding what the malware is doing, up to five outbound connections are allowed
through the firewall. This allows the collection of information regarding what tools the malware is
downloading to the compromised machine and who it is trying to communicate with. If the five
outbound connection threshold is reached, any additional attempts at an outbound connection will fail.
This failure will trigger an alarm to the administrators, notifying them that a honeypot has been
blocked. The honeynet sensor is also responsible for data collection. To provide more useful data
collection, the honeynet sensor collects data at multiple layers to “paint the big picture”. The Irish
Honeynet Project ran for a year, gaining statistical data on attacks. In February 2004, 1800 attacks
were recorded from 1121 unique IP addresses. The IP addresses came from 65 different countries. A
total of 45 different ports were targeted by the attacks. The wide range of sources and destinations
showed the variety in attacks that a system needs defense against.
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Defensive Techniques: Malware Detection
Signature-based Techniques
Signature-based malware detection techniques have been used extensively over the last few
decades, since malware has started to become more prevalent. They work on the premise that one can
find a unique sequence of characters (signature) in a piece of malware that will only be found in that
specific malware. One can then scan through everything on a machine and coming into the machine
for that signature. If it is found, it is treated as malware; if not, it is considered to be clean. These
techniques were initially effective because there was a limited amount of malware. Also, in
comparison to present machines, there was a smaller amount of legitimate software. With the
explosive growth in both malware and legitimate software, however, it is harder to find unique
signatures that are efficient to search for.
When using a signature-based technique of malware detection, there are several variables that
will determine if the technique will be successful enough. The first variable is if the list of signatures is
comprehensive enough to detect known malware. After developing all of the signatures, they need to
be stored in a manner that is quickly accessible, memory efficient, and computationally easy to locate.
A common solution to this is using a hash. The key is something that is efficient to create but yields an
accurate representation of the signature. The value is then usually the exact sequence of characters that
makes the signature. The length of the signature needs to be considered as well. If it is too short, it
will match too many strings and not provide useful information. If it is too long, it will be
computationally inefficient and a full system scan will take too long. This is particularly true of
systems that have low memory, processing power, or battery life. In an attempt to make a useful
signature-based malware detection system for mobile devices, Smobile Systems[9] studied a method of
using filter-hash strings. A signature-cut method is used to determine the smallest effective substring of
the signature to use for the filter-hash. This is the set of bytes in the signature that are the least likely to
appear in a legitimate piece of software. The aim is to eliminate legitimate software as quickly and
easily as possible to keep from wasting computational time. This filter-hash created from the cut
signature yields a key that is more general and matches to more signatures. However, it is
computationally efficient and cuts out enough legitimate software that it saves time. If there is no hit
from the filter-key, then computation on that particular signature ends and the next sequence can be
examined. If there is a match, the process continues to a DJB hash. A byte by byte comparison is done
before moving to the DJB hash. This is a more complex process, but it results in a stronger hash value.
The chance that the subsequences have the same DJB hash value is very low. The possible duplicates
are not in the range of legitimate character sequences, so it is considered to be more accurate. In order
to positively identify the signature as malware, the starting index of the cut signature is moved back to
the beginning of the initial sequence. The full hash of the signature is then taken with the DJB method
and the resulting signature is compared to the computed DJB value. If they match, it is considered
malware.
Another method of the signature-based malware detection systems is the scanning method.
Commercial antivirus software usually offers various scanning modes. The modes can range from a
full system scan, examining all files and data in memory, to only scanning files that have changed since
the last scan date. A changed file refers to a new file, a file that has been overwritten, or a file that has
been modified during the particular time frame. It is also possible to scan only incoming information,
such as email, instant messages, or Bluetooth transmissions. The scanning method and detection
algorithm needs to be able to handle different file sizes, different signature sizes, and various key and
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value sizes while still effectively comparing the varying sized signatures and scanned strings to
determine if they are malicious.
Signature-based malware detection has been effective in the past, but as more pieces of malware
are being released it is becoming harder to keep up with the attackers. Methods are being developed to
evade signature-based techniques. For example, polymorphic viruses can modify themselves as they
are redistributed so that the signatures can change for the same virus. In addition to modifying
themselves, the sheer number of viruses is becoming problematic. The assumption that signature-based
methods can detect malware is based on the assumption that a unique signature can be found for every
piece of malware. As more legitimate and illegitimate software is created, the unique strings are more
difficult to find, and some begin to overlap with each other. This creates a problem of false positives.
For signature-based methods to overcome this, they must first determine if a piece of software is
believed to be malware through signature scanning. They then use another method that ensures it is not
in fact a piece of legitimate software that shares the same signature as a piece of malware.
The problem of finding unique signatures is not the only or arguably largest problem of
signature-based detection methodologies. The nature of a signature means that the virus has been
studied enough that a unique or quasi-unique signature has been extrapolated. In order for this to be
true, the assumption has to be made that the malware has first been found. That makes these systems
ineffective at detecting new malware that strongly differs from anything currently released. It is
possible to detect a zero day attack if it happens to have an overlapping signature with an older attack,
or is close enough to it that the malware detection system will still flag it. This weakness means that
signature-based systems are usually coupled with other detection techniques for critical systems.
While signature-based methods are becoming more criticized, they are still used in many of the
most common antivirus products. Symantec, Trend Micro, and McAfee currently use signature based
scanning methods to look for and get rid of malware. However, they have noted that this method
(while not as on the decline as people believe) needs to be supported through other methods.
Symantec's senior director for product management was quoted in 2007 saying “Everyone agrees
signature-based defense is not enough.” Symantec plans to use more whitelisting technologies to try
and help the signature-based suite. Trend Micro is also looking forward to new technologies. While
still believing that there is utility in signature based methodologies, they intend to invest in more
heuristic-based approaches. McAfee continues to use signature-based approaches as well, combining
them with host-based intrusion prevention mechanisms. While McAfee is working to add more
prevention mechanisms on top of their current suite, they still feel that signatures are needed: “I can
understand why some would think signatures are dying, but it does go back to someone not really
understanding what a signature is. Some cleaning and repair can't be done without them,” said David
Marcus, McAfee's security research manager.[15]
Heuristic Techniques
A heuristic technique makes use of all available information to determine if the suspect data is
malware or not. The premise is that there is a fundamental difference between legitimate software and
malware. If something is examined long enough, a normal working pattern can be developed. When
things change enough from this studied and developed normal behavior model, then a heuristic
malware detector will determine that it is malware. This technique is beneficial because it does not rely
on having already seen the malware that is attacking the system. It relies on being able to identify a
normal working pattern, and identifying when the system has strayed far enough from the normal
working conditions to know that something is wrong. Many pieces of malware are written to mutate
their programming so that they operate the same way but are identified differently. These mutations
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will often throw off signature-based methods, but a heuristic method can still detect this malware.
A heuristic approach can work on many different levels. The system can be monitored on a file
by file level; it looks for variables such as creation and modification times, file location and use, file
density, or how the file is interacting with the operating system. It can also be used system-wide;
looking at all running processes, currently opened and closed ports, TCP and UDP connections, or CPU
and memory loads. Additionally, a heuristic approach can look at the network level to see if anything is
out of the ordinary. In this case, it would look at things such as the current amount of bandwidth used,
active machines, server loads, and activity to time of day comparisons. A heuristic technique can
effectively be used at any level where enough data can be collected so that a state of normalcy can be
defined. When enough information is collected that the malware detection system knows how the
system should be working at a particular time, it can make an educated decision as to whether it is
currently operating within the scope of what is expected. Due to the need to collect a significant
amount of data, a heuristic system often needs time to collect enough information before it can be
considered reliable. In this “down time”, another malware detection system is used to prevent attackers
from abusing the system and to try and weed out any false positives that might be triggered by the
heuristic system during its learning process.
When a heuristic technique is comparing the current state of the file(s), system, or network, a
probability model is used to identify if it is malware or not.[11] If the data in question has something
different from what it believes to be normal, its probability of being malware is increased. As these
differences add up, the probability increases until it reaches a certain threshold. The threshold can be
whatever is defaulted in the scanning system or something that the administrator has set. It can be
increased to try and avoid false positives or decreased in a more sensitive situation. The decision
process used to determine whether or not to increase the probability of being malware has to be
carefully created in order to create a useful heuristic model. It is often assisted with decision trees or
matrices, and a database of abnormal behavior can be created to gain confidence in the probability.
False positives can be a problem in heuristic models. Due to the nature of being probabilitybased, they can never be completely certain that the content in question is malware; they can only be
very confident. This is why heuristic models are often used in combination with other models. When
combined with a signature-based method, it can be useful for determining if a suspect file is infected
with something that has been seen before. This then makes it possible for the malware detection
software to identify malware with certainty. In addition, the heuristic model can help to detect malware
that the signature-based techniques cannot find due to a lack of relevant signatures.
General Decryption
As malware developed, a segment of encrypted viruses became particularly hard to detect.[11]
The malware would come in two pieces; a small segment to decrypt/encrypt the entire package, and the
payload. In addition to the encryption challenge, the viruses could also be polymorphic or
metamorphic. Polymorphic malware would modify itself enough to evade signature detection before
encrypting itself (with a new key) and propagating, while metamorphic malware would create an entire
new generation of itself before propagating, often not encrypting itself.
It is easy to detect when something could be a virus of this variant because it is easy to spot the
pattern of a decryption engine and an encrypted payload. The challenge is figuring out what it does so
that proper defensive and cleaning steps can be taken. A general decryption scanner completes this task
using three components. The first is an emulation environment where the virus is permitted to run
while being monitored. The second is a virus signature scanner used to detect what kind of virus it is
once it has been decrypted, and the third is an emulation control module. The virus is then run in the
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emulation environment while the control module follows it step by step. After the virus has decrypted
itself, but before it has done any damage, the signature scanner is used to try and detect the type of
virus. With this information, the general decryption engine can disinfect the machine. Even if the
malware were able to infect the emulation environment, it would not do any harm to the actual system
because it is contained.
In the event the signature scanner cannot determine what the malware is, or if it is metamorphic,
a heuristic approach is used to confirm that it is malware and to try and identify what kind. The
heuristic technology observes and scores the behavior of the package. The score is then used to
determine if the package is malware. Based on a configured threshold on a numerical rating based on
the observation. It is possible that while the package contains the encrypted malware structure of a
decryption header followed by an encrypted payload, it is legitimate software. Using the heuristic
model can determine if it should be allowed to execute in a real environment or if its execution should
be limited to an emulator so that it can be monitored to determine exactly what it does.
This method targets a specific family of viruses, but makes use of both signature and heuristicbased malware detection techniques. This increases the chance that it will be able to determine if a
piece of software is malware or not. By isolating the package to an emulated environment, it keeps the
malware from propagating and morphing itself. This technique is also useful because it does not
require the malware detection software to be able to figure out the encrypted payload. Given the
various kinds of encryption and strengths of encryption, it would not be feasible to try and decrypt
every package needs to be examined without knowing any information about how it was encrypted or
what the key is. Letting the package run so that it decrypts itself saves computer resources and time.
Integrity Verification
Before using or executing a file, it is possible to examine it for something wrong using the
previous techniques. However, instead of doing this, another method is to ensure that what you are
about to execute is correctly built as you had expected. This can be done by checking the integrity of
the file before using it. The most common method of doing this is by using cryptographic hash
functions. The two current popular hash functions are the SHA-1 and the MD5. The hash function
takes the file as input and outputs a shorter representation of the file that is pseudo-unique to the file.
Then, when you want to use the file, you use the same process to reproduce the hash of the file. If they
are the same, this indicates that it is safe to use because it has not been modified. Had it been modified,
a different hash value would have been produced. Each time a legitimate modification of the file is
made a new hash value is created so that only unknown modifications will cause an alert.
The initial problem with these types of utilities are the collisions. This occurs when two
varying inputs result in the same output. This is problematic because it means it is possible to change
the file, yet produce the same hash value. In the current hashes, this is resolved by trying to ensure that
the collisions are not meaningful. If two files produce the same hash output, one of them is a
combination of unusable characters that would never be used as a legitimate file. Another way of
dealing with collisions is to use more than one hash. While there might be collisions in both of the
hashes, they should not share the same collisions. This means that even if one is modified in a manner
that it produces the same hash value, the second hash used will differ and the file will not be accepted
as unaltered unless both hash values match.
Another problem with integrity verification through hashing is that it is difficult to ensure that
the hash value itself cannot be modified. If the file in question is modified, and the program that
maliciously modified it also has the capability of rehashing the file, it could just modify the hash value
to match the modifications it made so that no alarms will be raised. Often, to combat this problem, the
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hash values themselves are kept in a secure read-only location. Then, in order to update them or
modify them based on legitimate changes, a secure procedure has to be completed in order for the hash
values to be changed. This can be accomplished by using a keyed hash function. That is a hash
function that will yield the same results, but needs a key to produce the hash value. Then the key can
be securely stored and the hash value cannot be easily derived.
Classically, integrity verification has been used to determine if a file has been modified.
However, it has not been strictly used to determine if the file is infected, malicious, or even where the
file has been changed. It could be used just to ensure that the file has not changed for any reason,
including a legitimate one. Cryptographic hashing is used to find where the virus is in the file. Finding
where the virus is in the file is referred to as virus localization. When trying to determine virus
localization, it is important to know the infection techniques the malware can use on the file - rewriting,
appending/prepending, and embedding. When a virus uses a rewriting technique, it just replaces
portions of an executable file with itself. Appending and prepending malware inserts itself at the end or
beginning of the file, respectively. If it is appended, a jump instruction can be put at the beginning so
that the malware is executed first before giving control back to the original executable. An embedded
virus inserts a pointer to itself in the executable that will load the malware when the file is executed.
The malicious code is not actually in the executable, but in some other file. If the original file can be
accessed, as well as the differing file, it is possible to break the two files into blocks of a single segment
size (such as a per line basis for source code) and then hash each block. The differing blocks would
show where the virus was located. This technique is too inefficient to be used regularly because of the
expansion of the hash sizes (which are commonly too large to begin with). The resulting hashes would
be unusably large for a file as small as a few kilobytes. However, some assumptions can be made. In
order to find virus localization, you can assume that you only need to find approximately one-quarter of
the file differing; any more than that, and the localization question is a moot point because too much of
the file is infected for it to be legitimately used.
The blocks investigated can also be limited based on the infection techniques. Only the first
portion of a file needs to be examined for a prepending virus. The file can then be inverted so that the
last blocks appear first until the first block is seen last. The same technique used to find a prepended
virus can be used to find an appended virus. In a rewriting virus, the fact that rewritten data is usually
in adjacent blocks can be used to eliminate at least half of the blocks that need to be investigated. Once
a difference is found, the adjacent blocks can be examined. The problem of investigating an embedded
virus is more difficult because it can be located anywhere. However, instead of trying to develop a
novel technique, or scan the entire file, the two previous localization techniques can be combined to try
and find the embedded virus.
IMDS: Intelligent Malware Detection System
The IMDS[10] is an approach to malware detection aimed at Windows Portable Executables
(PE). The PE file format is used to provide a common format that can be used across different
Windows operating systems. Many new viruses are taking advantage of the cross compatibility of the
PE API. This allows them to be executed on many different versions of Windows. The IMDS consists
of three core modules: the PE Parser, an Objective-Oriented Association (OOA) rule generator, and a
rule-based classifier.
Instead of using a disassembler, the PE Parser is used to construct the API execution sequence
of the PE file. If the file is compressed or otherwise modified by a third party application, the
modifications have to be undone for the PE Parser to work. Once the API execution sequence has been
obtained, the API database is queried to generate a 32-bit global identification (ID) that represents the
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static execution sequence of the corresponding API functions. These global IDs are used as signatures
for the PE files. They are stored in a signature database with six fields: record ID, PE file name, file
type (malicious or not), called API sequence name, called API ID, and total number of called API
functions.
This data is then mined by the OOA algorithm to generate class association rules which are
recorded in the rule database. After examining enough legitimate and illegitimate pieces of software, a
pattern develops that differentiates the two by the sequence of API calls used. The data mining helps to
find the patterns so that it is possible to distinguish the legitimacy of the software. The rules generated
and the selected API calls are passed to a malware detection module that then produces the final report
and decision as to whether or not it is malware. Many tests were run across 29,580 executables, of
which 12,214 were benign and 17,366 were malicious. When comparing popular anti-virus software,
the IMDS was able to detect the following polymorphic viruses: Beagle, Blaster, Lovedoor, Mydoom
and variants of those viruses (up to 15 variations total). It was the only malware detection solution that
successfully detected them all; Norton AntiVirus, MacAfee, Dr. Web, and Kaspersky failed to detect
them all. When detecting unknown malware, the IMDS was able to classify 92%. The next two
MacAfee and Kaspersky, only discovered 75.3% and 78% respectively. In addition to detecting more
malware and its variants, the IMDS had fewer false positives and a more efficient data mining
algorithm.
The SpyProxy Projet
SpyProxy[6] is an application developed to ensure that a web page is not doing anything
malicious to the user trying to access it. When the user goes to a web page, the request is intercepted
by SpyProxy. The page is then accessed in its virtualization environment and the effects the web page
have on the environment are measured. If anything unusual happens (such as spawning a process or
trying to download unwanted files), the web page is blocked. All of this is accomplished with only
adding 600ms of latency to the initial page loading time.
When a HTTP request is made and is intercepted by SpyProxy, it first checks the cache to see if
it already has data pertaining to the web page. For this purpose, the application Squid Web cache was
used to do additional filtering. If the page is cached, then processing is done from the cache, otherwise
it goes to the web to fetch the content. A static analysis is then performed to determine if a dynamic
analysis using the VM is necessary. The dynamic analysis is a VM with a browser that is set to respond
to the application. It can request the web page in the VM and then determine if it is safe or not. This is
more time consuming, so the static analysis is used to try and filter out content when possible. The
static analysis determines if the web page is passive or active. A passive web page contains no content
that will be executed, where an active web page contains things that will be executed such as ActiveX
or Flash. While a page can be determined to be passive, it is still possible for it to be malicious. For
instance, there have been vulnerabilities found in PNGs and JPGs. For this reason a web page will only
pass static analysis if it is passive and only contains HTML code. It is possible that an exploit can be
found in the processing of the raw HTML code, so for this reason the static analyzer can be completely
turned off if necessary. If the web page passes the static analyzer it is sent to the user to be viewed
without going through the dynamic analysis. To ensure the safety of the content, the analysis is done
starting at the root of the web request.
The threshold of the static analyzer is set to err on the safe side. If the web page is considered
active or it contains any non-HTML content, it is sent to the VM for dynamic analysis to determine its
safety. The web browser in the VM then fully renders the web page from the root directory. While it is
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rendering, the VM is checking what has been modified to determine if it is safe or not. If nothing
malicious has occurred, the web site is considered safe and sent to the user. The VM has all
unnecessary services disabled and the web browser is the out of the box installation with no additional
add-ons; this is to try and limit the possibility of something happening due to something unrelated to
the web page access. If the web page is safe, it should not access the file system outside of safe zones
(cache for example), spawn unexpected processes, or crash the browser or the operating system. These
kinds of events are trigger events. If any of these things are triggered in the VM, the web page is
considered malicious and is subsequently blocked.
The dynamic analysis can only detect malicious content if the malware is triggered in the
sandbox-like environment. However, if the malicious content does not always execute itself, it is
possible for it to not execute during the dynamic analysis. This would then allow the page to be
accessed by the user, where it could possibly be triggered. The developers of SpyProxy have suggested
fixing this error by duplicating any dynamic user interaction with the web page in the VM before the
results are passed back to the user. If the malware is set to trigger on a particular user action (such as
data being input in a field), then this setup would help to catch malicious content that is not initially
triggered. Another limitation to the SpyProxy setup is that the web page must have completed
rendering before it can be determined safe or not. If a web page does not terminate until some user
interaction has occurred it could time out and be considered unsafe. To try and avoid delayed attacks,
the VM moves the time forward to detect any changes in the content. If the web page times out
without completing, it is considered unsafe. This could become problematic for interfaces that wait for
user input, but it could be solved with the aforementioned strategy.
To test the effectiveness of the system, 100 known malicious web sites were gathered from
Google, black lists, and SiteAdvisor. The sites used varied methods to deliver malicious content.
Some tried to force the malware on the user by asking them to install it. In this case, SpyProxy
automatically accepts the request and installs the software. If any trigger events go off after the
software is installed, it is considered unsafe. SpyProxy was able to detect 100% of the unsafe sites and
accurately blocked them all. SiteAdvisor mis-categorized 20% of the malicious sites as safe. All of the
tested sites were unsafe, so there is no data regarding false positives.
VMM-Based Sensors for Monitoring Honeypots
The nature of a honeypot has led to the adoption of virtualization. Using virtualization allows
for honeypots to be destroyed when compromised, and to be restarted from a saved state without going
through the overhead of rebuilding the honeypot. This has led to Virtual Machine Monitors (VMM)
being used in the implementation of honeypots. In addition, the VMM can also be used to monitor the
honeypot for malware.
The two most common ways to monitor a honeypot are by examining network traffic, or by
placing a monitoring application within the honeypot. Using network traffic to monitor for attacks
limits the amount of information that can be gained due to the lack of specific system information that
is obtained. Placing the monitoring application inside the honeypot allows for more thorough data
collection and thusly more fine-grained intrusion-detection. However, it also puts the monitoring
application in a vulnerable position. If the system is compromised, it is possible for the monitoring
application to also be compromised, losing all meaningful data. Using the VMM to place sensors[52]
that monitor the kernel of the honeypot has the advantage of being able to get detailed data from the
honeypot, but removes the vulnerability of being accessible through the honeypot. The virtual machine
barriers allow for the sensors to monitor the honeypot from a location inaccessible to any potential
malware within the honeypot.
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A design decision was made to only monitor the kernel for malicious activity based on two
assumptions. The first was that the monitors should be lightweight and applicable to various operating
systems and applications. The second was that any meaningful attack that is aimed at making
persistent changes must involve the kernel in some way. To achieve efficient kernel monitoring,
“invocation points” were established in parts of the kernel execution code where a trap is inserted.
When an event of interest occurs, an interrupt is triggered.. The interrupt handler of the VMM is then
modified to call the appropriate event handler. The event handler investigates the state of the kernel
and any information available through the trap. It determines if more invocation points should be
created, alarms should be raised, the event should be logged, or if execution should continue as normal.
If execution should continue, the trap is temporarily removed and replaced with the original execution
instruction. The kernel then resumes execution at the step just prior to the trap being triggered. When
execution has passed where the trap was, the trap is replaced so that the same event will cause another
interrupt. The traps and associated event handlers are referred to as sensors.
An example of a sensor is given that operates with xinetd configuration files. The observation
was made that this configuration file is often modified to associate a shell with access to an opened port
so that an attacker can connect to and control the compromised computer. The trap is inserted to detect
whenever the /etc/xinetd.conf is opened for modification. When the trap is triggered, the event handler
examines the registry, temporary variables, and the symbol table to determine if the modification is
malicious. Based on the outcome of these variables, the execution is permitted or denied. An example
of this sensor, including the trap and the associated event handler, is available in Appendix A.
A small amount of sensors can provide a large amount of security. For the evaluation of this
prototype, only four sensors were used. The first was a socket sensor. The invocation point was in the
sys_bind handler that controlled what processes were listening on what points. The event handler
ensured that only authorized processes were binding to the appropriate authorized port. The second
sensor detects sensitive inode access by putting the invocation point in the virtual file system
subroutine used to find the directory entry for the accessed file. At this location, the event handler can
accurately get the absolute path of the file and the associated inode. The sensor raises an alarm if the
file is listed as sensitive, but has a mismatched inode with the one on file, or the file is sensitive and is
being opened for modification. The third sensor monitors for stream redirections redirecting stdin,
stdout, and stderr to a socket. The invocation point is within the exec system call. The sensor first
determines if the spawned program is an interactive shell. If it is, the sensor checks the file descriptors
to determine if redirection is to a socket. The sensor then checks to determine if the socket is directed
to an external IP to ensure local programs interacting with each other do not trigger false-positives.
The final argument capture sensor records arguments passed to spawning processes of interest. To do
this, two different sensors are used. The first sensor is in the exec system call handler to determine if
the spawning process is one of interest. If the process is of interest, the sensor activates another sensor
that is stored within the loop. It copies all of the elements from the argument's array to the new
process's stack. Once the initial arguments array has been recorded, the sensor is deactivated to prevent
the sensor from unnecessarily recording all information about the running process. By capturing these
arguments, it is possible to find what machines are being externally accessed. This could be used to
determine if malicious tools are being loaded on to a compromised machine, where those tools are
coming from, and what invocation points are being used to get the tools.
Using a Sandbox to Find Hidden Code in Packed Binaries
Monitoring code execution and reverse-engineering techniques yield information about
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malware that is valuable in identifying and stopping it. To increase the impact of their malware,
attackers have utilized different packing techniques to hide the malicious code. Compression and
encryption techniques can be used to obfuscate the malicious binary. The only readily available
execution instructions are those that unpack the hidden portion. There can be several layers of
encryption of compression, causing the package to load the unpacking routines into memory, then go
through a cycle of unpacking and reloading memory instructions until the malicious binary is executed.
The several layers of embedded information make accurate disassembly and reverse-engineering
difficult.
Instead of trying to determine the malicious contents by reverse-engineering the package, the
fact that at some point the malicious code has to be loaded in to memory can be utilized. The malware
can be allowed to execute in a sandbox so that it can be monitored to find the malicious segments. The
Renovo[55] project finds the malicious portion of packed executables by monitoring memory during
execution in a sandbox.
The sandbox uses a fine-grained emulation environment that allows for step by step code
execution. In particular, the execution environment is looking for instructions that change the flow of
execution. The section of code that is responsible for unpacking the malicious code is referred to as the
hidden layer. Many hidden layers can exist to further obfuscate the binary. When the execution flow
changes from a point that was within the bounds of the initially loaded memory to an area in memory
that was written to after initially loading the instructions, the execution flow has changed layers. The
location of the instruction pointer in the newly written section of code is the entry point to the next
layer. To monitor the change of layers, the memory is monitored. When the program code is initially
loaded, there is a section of program code, a section of packed data, and a section of reserved empty
memory. When the reserved memory has not been written to, it is considered clean. When that
memory is written to, the areas that were written are dirty. When the instruction pointer moves to a
dirty region, that location is the entry point to a new layer that is potentially the packed data. This
process is illustrated in Appendix C.
A table, similar to the memory page table, is maintained and referred to as the shadow memory.
This table associates a bit with each memory address that keeps track of clean and dirty memory.
Within the emulated execution environment, kernel modules monitor the creation and execution of
processes. This allows Renovo to continue to monitor memory addresses associated with the malicious
binary even if it spawns different threads to unpack the executable. Once the dirty memory has been
accessed and the entry point recorded, the shadow memory can be wiped to clean and the process
restarted to continue going through several hidden layers. To prevent an infinite loop, a time-out period
can be set at which point the sandbox will stop analyzing the executable. This prevents the malware
from just continuing the cycle to waste system resources. It also stops the monitoring of memory in the
event that the malware is not packed in a hidden manner. If it is an executable with no additional
layers, it is possible that no dirty memory will ever be accessed.
This approach to monitoring the execution environment based on access to recently-written
memory addresses allows for a dynamic approach to unpacking malicious executables. The sandbox
environment ensures that it is done in a safe manner that cannot spread to the host machine. This same
process could be used for testing unverified software to monitor where the memory writes to and where
it executes from.
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Defensive Techniques: Aiding Malware Detection
Virtual Introspection
In order to virtualize the operating system environment, all semantic information regarding the
operating system has to be stored on the hosting machine and manipulated by the Virtual Machine
Monitor (VMM). Components like RAM, running processes, or registry information is stored in a
manner that is accessible by the host of the VM. When doing a forensic analysis looking for malware,
it is often difficult to analyze a live machine because the infection could have software that destroys the
system when it detects that it is being scanned, or have stealth-like qualities to hide it from the analysis.
When doing a forensic analysis, third party tools have to be used to avoid this, but it often leads to a
forensic copy being made of the hard drive(s) and examined on a different machine. The most
common way of doing this is to shut down the machine and then copy it over. However, it can be done
while it is running using network utilities – the downside is that it is possible to modify the system and
lose vital evidence. Any modifications made to the system could ruin the presentation of evidence in a
legal setting.
Due to the way the VMM stores semantic information on the hosting system, it is possible to
perform virtual introspection[7] of a compromised VM without modifying its behavior. All of the tools
needed to extract volatile information that would be lost when the computer is shut down (open ports,
running processes, loaded modules, etc.) can be used without modifying the VM. The information
stored on the hosting system can be read and reconstructed in the same manner the VMM reads and
reconstructs it for use within the VM. This read-only approach would not modify anything within the
VM. After it has been reconstructed so that the live data from within the VM can be examined outside
the VM, this data can be analyzed without the fear of tampering with evidence. Virtual introspection
would allow for the examination of volatile information without the concern of altering information or
ruining evidence. Once the volatile information has been recovered from the VM, the forensic process
can occur as usual. Not only is this beneficial to forensic investigations, it is also beneficial to malware
detection. It allows for a suspect system to be analyzed in an environment where modifications that
could possibly alert the malware to forensic activity can be made without concern.
Semantic View Reconstruction
Stealthy viruses have an advantage when facing traditional malware detection systems. They
can see how the malware detection system is operating because they are running within the system that
they are attacking.[2] This means that malware can detect the various anti-malware processes and try
to disable them while gaining control of the system. The malware detection system also has the
advantage of gaining a semantic view of the system due to running “in the box”, or within the system.
This allows the malware detection software to examine running processes, files, or kernel modules ,
which aids in their detection capabilities. If instead of the operating system running locally, it was run
inside a virtual machine, it would be possible to run the malware detection system outside of the
system, thereby gaining an “out of the box” view of the system. This would also remove the malware's
capability of examining the malware detection systems before trying to launch its payload. The
problem is that by running “outside of the box”, the malware detection system loses the semantic view
of the hosted system. Instead of seeing running processes, the malware detection system sees memory
pages, registers, and disk blocks.
To gain the benefit of both worlds, the VMwatcher works with the Virtual Machine Monitor
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(VMM) to reconstruct a semantic view of the VM.[2] The goals of the VMwatcher are to
unobtrusively inspect the VM for low level (VMM level) state information without using anything
within the VM. Then, it reconstructs the semantic view of the guest externally so that a malware
detection system that could run inside the system could be run outside of the system on the
reconstructed view without any modifications. The goals are generalized so that the VMwatcher is
generic enough to work with different VMMs (VMWare, Xen, UML, etc.) and different host operating
systems. The prototype was implemented on a Windows and a Linux system successfully.
The VMwatcher operates under the assumption that the VMM can provide high levels of
isolation between the VM and the hosting system. This means that it is possible for the VM to be
highly contaminated with malware but the hosting machine remains uncontaminated because nothing
can be passed between the VM and the hosting machine. Under this assumption, if malware targets the
VM specifically for the purpose of detecting and evading malware detection systems, it will not be able
to evade the VMwatcher. The VMwatcher should not even be detectable by the malware, and any
modifications the malware makes to the VM should not effect how VMwatcher operates (such as
rootkits). This makes detecting stealthy malware much easier. No operations from the VM are used for
semantic reconstruction; all of this information is provided within the host file system so that the VMM
can load the VM. Using this same information, it is possible to recreate the view from inside the VM
outside of the VM. With this reconstruction, standard malware detection applications can be run on the
reconstructed view without being hindered by the effects of the malware. For example, if a rootkit
were to be installed to prevent malicious processes from showing, the view outside of the box is
reconstructed from the files running the VM, so this information cannot be hidden from the
VMwatcher. This gives the VMwatcher the capability to allow malware detection systems to run
without being affected by malware.
Using the VMwatcher, new malware detection techniques can be used. Aside from being able
to operate on a view of the host without being modified by the host, a comparison analysis can be done.
To detect stealth malware, a system scan can be done inside the box and outside, then the results can be
compared. Anything differing between the two would likely be caused by stealthy malicious software.
The view comparison can be done on a system level or a lower file or process level. Due to the
capabilities of the VMwatcher to reconstruct the semantics of the VM, any internal component (volatile
memory, NIC properties, swap information, etc.) can be analyzed both inside and outside the box, and
the results can be compared.
The prototype created was able to run with four different VMMs: VMware, QEMU, Xen, and
UML, and it supported variations of Windows, Red Hat, and Fedora Core for semantic reconstruction.
10 different Windows rootkits and a dozen different Linux rootkits were used to test the comparisonbased methodology. This methodology attacks the nature of rootkits by showing what has been hidden
inside the box. The prototype was able to detect all rootkits by scanning inside and outside the box,
then comparing the results. The scans were done with standard unmodified malware detection software
(Symantec AntiVirus, for example). If the malware detection software was able to detect the malware
in the box, then the benefit is irrelevant. However, the rootkits were able to hide themselves from the
malware detection system inside the box. When the same scan was done outside the box with the same
malware detection system, the rootkits were found.
Controlled Program Execution Using Manitou
The hypervisor controls access to hardware from either below the operating system
(intercepting system calls between the hardware and OS) or above the operating system (intercepting
system calls between software running in the OS and the OS). In order to control what has execution
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privileges on a system, the Manitou[1] project implemented the hypervisor below the operating system
between the OS and the paging calls to the processor.
Most major processors (including AMD and Intel) have implemented the paged memory and
per-page executable and writable bits. Manitou leverages these bits to determine what is permitted to
run. In order to remain generic enough to run with any OS or supported software, Manitou examines
each memory page as it goes to the processor. In doing this, Manitou does not have to understand the
semantics of the OS or the software it supports. Instead, it runs in the hypervisor below the OS,
monitoring each request sent to the CPU.
To determine if a request is valid or not, a cryptographic hash is taken of the page. The hash is
then stored in a table. If the hash of the page appears in the table, the page's executable or writable bit
is set according to whichever the page is requesting. Manitou only allows execution or writing; it does
not allow both. This is done to prevent the execution from modifying something maliciously to then
allow non-approved pages to execute malicious code. If the hash is not found in the table, the
execution bit is not set and a page fault is returned to the OS. The OS then handles this in its own
manner, usually by terminating the faulty application.
There are a few suggestions to determine if a page's hash should be allowed in the table or not.
The first is to have a signature-type body governing the software. If it is digitally signed by a
supported body, then the hash is allowed in the table. This could be convenient for large companies or
someone with a network large enough that a Public Key Infrastructure can be established. For a home
user or a situation where that is not optimal, the user is allowed to add a hash to the table. This is done
through an isolated channel between the user and Manitou instead of being managed by the OS. The
goal is to have no interaction with the OS in case it has been compromised. A user can assign a specific
group to the hashes being added to the table so that they can all be correlated to a specific application.
This makes it easier to manage the table at a later time.
If a hash is added to the table that is determined to have negative consequences to the system,
the hash can simply be removed from the table. This does not remove the software from the system but
it does revoke its execution and write privileges. It will remain on the system, but will be incapable of
accessing the system in any way. The ability to revoke an application's privileges allows for users to
make mistakes when installing software. The current paradigm of software installation makes it
difficult to get rid of malware once it has already been installed. By using virtualization, the user is
permitted to make mistakes that can compromise the system, recognize the error, and then revoke that
application's rights. Once the application can no longer access the system, removal of the malware can
be performed in an easier manner than if it was still permitted to access the system.
Program Isolation Using Solitude
Instead of implementing the hypervisor below the OS to limit access to hardware (such as with
Manitou), Solitude[5] creates an isolation file system (IFS) that can be generated on demand for any
application that will isolate the application from the base file system. In a manner very similar to the
FVM, Solitude uses a copy-on-write scheme to create different isolation environments for the
applications. Using the assumption that most malware enters a system from a network connection,
Solitude suggests creating separate IFSs for each application that accesses the network. One of the
differences between Solitude and the FVM is that Solitude has a policy for sharing files between
different IFSs or an IFS and the base system.
The copy-on-write mechanism contains all writes that try and access the base system inside the
IFS. If a program later needs to be removed, the IFS can be removed and the base system will be
unchanged. Copy-on-write also limits the propagation of attacks through shared updates. Outside of
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providing a safe sandbox-type environment for untrusted applications to run in, Solitude also aims to
create an environment where post-intrusion analysis and recovery is simplified. The last benefit of
copy-on-write is that configuring read access is not necessary when reading is allowed between the IFS
and the base system. Reading is such a common (yet fairly secure) occurrence that properly
configuring read access to every part of the base system would be a difficult and error-prone process.
While read access is allowed to the base system, Solitude still offers the functionality to block read
access to specific parts of the base system when necessary, if explicitly supplied by the user. To
accomplish the IFS isolation model, the isolation environment is mounted in a predefined portion of the
file system. The untrusted application to be “jailed” is then chroot'd to the isolation point. The
application's privileges are then restricted based on how they would have been in the base system. If it
normally would not be allowed root access, then it is not allowed access to the base of the mount point.
The Vserver secure chroot barrier is then added. This contains a special flag on the parent directory
that helps to prevent the jailed application from escaping.
Maintaining an IFS for varying applications helps to stop cross-contamination of software. For
instance, if a piece of software is installed that contains malware to exploit a vulnerability in a web
server, the malware will not have access to the web server and will not be able to contaminate it.
However, there are many instances where a jailed application needs to have access to other
applications. For instance, if newly downloaded imaging software is installed in one IFS, an image
created by this software would be contained within the IFS. But if a different viewer resides in another
IFS, the viewer would not have access to the file. There are two solutions that Solitude provides to get
around this problem. The first is to simply install both applications in the same IFS. Then each
application would have the same access rights and would be able to view files created by either
application. The second option is to use the file sharing policy. It is possible to allow a file access to
the base system from within an IFS. To keep the policies simple, there is no mechanism to allow for
sharing directly between different IFSs. Instead, the sharing has to be done to the base system and two
different IFSs can share the content through the base system. Six different sharing modes are available
- three for reading and three for writing.
The default read mode (Rshare) allows for transparent reading from the base system. When the
application in the IFS tries to update the object being read, it is copied into the IFS and the copied
version is modified. The Rsnapshot mode allows for copy-on-write to be maintained in both directions.
As soon as the IFS is created, the file being accessed is copied in to the IFS before being modified. All
further modifications made by the jailed application are done to the copy in the IFS. Conversely, all
modifications done by the base system to the file remain in the base system and are not made in the
copy maintained in the IFS. The third option is Rdeny. This hides the particular file in the base system
from the IFS so that the jailed application does not know of its existence. An Rdeny overrides any of
the write settings. The Wisolate mode is the default write mode. It employees the standard copy-onwrite policy that isolates all modifications to the IFS environment. The Wcommit option allows for a
file in the IFS to be committed back to the base system at a later time. The commit can only be
initiated by the base system to prevent malicious software from committing its self. The Wshare option
allows for immediate writing to a file in the base system. This is to be used with applications that are
trusted, or to applications writing to terminal sessions or directories like /dev/null.
The sharing policies of Solitude allow for the potential spread of malware. To make the
propagation of malware trackable, easier to analyze, and then easier to eventually recover from,
Solitude implemented a taint policy. If a file transitions from the IFS to the base system it is a tainted
file. If a process interacts with that file, the process becomes tainted. Any file that process then
interacts with is marked as tainted and all children processes of that process are considered tainted.
The tainting algorithm works at the kernel level and is capable of marking any kernel objects as tainted.
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Once an object is marked as tainted, it becomes logged. Any files that are committed are logged, and
the processes that access files to become tainted (or taint a file) are logged so that the taint propagation
can be analyzed. None of the interactions that are isolated to the IFS are logged. The assumption is
that if anything malicious happens within the IFS the entire environment can be removed to remove the
malware. The purpose of the logging system is largely for analysis and later recovery. When the taint
begins through a commit there is a commit ID and an IFS ID that is also logged in the records. This
allows an analyzer to determine which IFS caused the malware propagation.
To recover from malware, the first option is to remove the IFS environment. This will remove
all changes the malware has made to the system if it was not allowed to write to the base system.
However, if it was allowed to write to the base system, the changes can still be undone. The commit
and IFS ID can be supplied to generate a taint dependency graph. The same taint algorithm used to
determine if a file should be tainted can be used to find all files and processes that were tainted because
each execution of a taint rule is logged. It is then suggested that each file be inspected for malware. A
previous project referred to as Taser can be used to roll back files to a snapshot before the taint was
registered to automate the process. The snapshots are taken as soon as the IFS requests the file.
Collecting Malware with Honeypots
The Nepenthes[45] honeypot takes a low interaction approach to honeypots, but incorporates a
modular design to allow for more flexibility. The Nepenthes honeypot emulates vulnerable services. It
uses a modular design so that services can be changed depending on the network traffic they interact
with. The core Nepenthes daemon manages network connections with other modules. The other types
of modules include vulnerability, shellcode parsing, fetch, submission, and logging modules. The
vulnerability modules emulate the vulnerable services that are to be attacked. The shellcode parsing
modules then parse the incoming payload to the vulnerability modules to extract the malware
information. From the extracted information, the fetch module downloads the malware from a remote
location. The submission module then determines how the fetched malware is to be stored (on a hard
disk or removable media, database, network location, etc.), while the logging modules gather
information about the emulation to get an overview of malware attack patterns.
The modular approach allows for Nepenthes to be efficient locally or in a distributed
environment. It was demonstrated emulating 16,000 IP addresses on one physical machine. The
vulnerability modules also allow for the creation of custom modules with specific reactive, logging, or
reporting mechanisms. For instance, a general FTP server can be represented on a port. Then,
depending on how the attacker interacts with the port, the vulnerability module can display itself as a
Unix protocol or a Win32 protocol.
Worms can be detected by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) due to the port scans they
perform to find more vulnerable targets to infect.[46] This makes detecting many worms trivial to an
IDS. For example, the Blaster worm[48] triggered a Snort[49] alert before a signature was created to
detect the worm.[46] Bots differ from worms in that they do not automatically perform a port scan
after infecting a computer. They wait dormant until they receive a command from Command and
Control (C&C) servers. These commands typically come over an IRC channel. This makes detecting
bots more difficult than detecting worms. Appendix B demonstrates the number of C&Cs operating
over selected IRC ports that have been closed due to bots.[47]
Due to the flexibility and customization available with Nepenthes, it is much easier to detect
malware, including bots.[45] The emulation of vulnerable services allows Nepenthes to monitor IRC
channels as well as network traffic to detect C&C commands, as well as port scans. The emulated
modules allows for efficient detection of malware. After detection, the malware can be collected and
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stored in a customized manner. The binaries can then be sent to a sandbox to be analyzed. The
binaries can also be scanned by standard anti-virus software to determine if the current signatures can
detect the malware. The binaries collected by Nepenthes were scanned by four different commercial
anti-virus engines. Figure 5 shows the percentage of malware identified based on the total number of
malicious binaries collected and the malicious binaries collected in the last 24 hours.[45]
AV Engine 1
Complete set (14,414 binaries) 85.0%

AV Engine 2 AV Engine 3

AV Engine 4

85.3%

78.1%

90.2%

Latest 24 hours (460 binaries) 82.6%
77.8%
84.1%
73.1%
Figure 5: Four anti-virus engines used to scan collected malware. The first row depicts the percentage
of malware detected from the entire set of collected malicious binaries. The second row shows the
percentage of malware detected from binaries collected in the last 24 hours. All binaries collected were
malicious; the percentage not detected represents malware the anti-virus scanner could not detect.
The customization allowed in containing and storing malware permits many different analysis
techniques that can yield useful statistical information regarding the network. This can be used to
determine if any malware is currently traveling through the local network, or the types and percentages
of malware attacking the network externally. It can also be used to determine if attacks are coming
from a specific source, or what areas of the network are most prone to attack. The modular design of
vulnerability emulation could be used in other ways to raise alerts in a production environment when an
attack is occurring.
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Comparison of Defensive Techniques for Specific Malware
Table 1 below matches types of malware with the studied defensive techniques. The columns
represent the specific types of malware examined in this study, while the rows are the specific computer defense mechanisms examined. The intersection of the columns and rows displays how well the defensive mechanism defends against the specific type of malware. A ““ means the defensive mechanism works well against the malware. An “X” means the defensive mechanism does not defend well
against the specific type of malware. Some of the defensive mechanisms studied allow for a new approach to malware detection, but are not actually a malware detection system. In the cases where a defensive technique would increase the malware detection capabilities of a third party malware detection
system, it is marked with a “+”. Defensive mechanisms that can be utilized to benefit a system after
malware has compromised it are marked with a “-”.
When matching specific types of malware to a specific defensive mechanism, some correlations
do not fall perfectly into one category. When this occurs, a number accompanies the rating in a subscript that correlates with an explanation below the table. The ratings given assume that sufficient information is supplied to the malware detection system. For example, it is assumed that signatures are
supplied or that heuristic approaches have collected enough data to build accurate baselines.

Table 1: A comparison of malware defensive techniques and selected malware.
1: Virtual introspection allows for a malware detection system to work without any hindrance from the
operating system or malware. This makes it an ideal addition to any malware detection system looking
for malicious binaries in the operating system. In particular, it would help identify rootkits that could
hide themselves from a malware detection system running from within the compromised operating system.

41
2: SpyProxy loads webpages in a virtual machine. All prompts are answered yes and all executables are
run. Diagnostics in the virtual machine then determine if anything malicious is occurring. Malicious binaries and the other types of studied malware can be delivered through a malicious website. Given ideal circumstances, including appropriate diagnostic tools in the virtual machine, SpyProxy could detect
all of these malware if they were delivered via web page.
3: Program isolation and controlled program execution can stop malware from running or spreading on
a compromised machine. However, these techniques work on executables that the user has given permission to run or identified a unique application layer for. If the malware accessed the system through
an attack surface that did not put it within the scope of these defense techniques, such as an exploit,
they will not be able to help.
4: VMM-based sensors have the same advantage the SpyProxy project has. They can monitor a virtual
machine for any malicious changes at the kernel level in a way that cannot be interrupted by malware.
The execution of a malicious binary or exploitation of a vulnerable process can be detected with a
properly placed trap. However, it requires that the operating system is running within a virtual machine.
It does not trap malware within the native operating system.
5: Signature-based detection methods detect malicious binaries by matching a sequence of characters in
the binary with a known malicious sequence of characters. It is possible to detect rootkits with this
same manner. However, rootkits are difficult to detect with a signature-based scanning method because
they can hide very well from the scanning mechanism.
6: A heuristic malware detection technique could detect any malware that causes the system to measurably change it's working conditions. However, in order to detect the specific types of malware studied
different metrics would need to be monitored. For example, network metrics (bandwidth usage, network connections, etc.) would need to be monitored to detect a spammer program while system metrics
(running processes, memory usages, etc.) would be needed to detect a virus.
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Suggested Methods of Securing Unverified Data
Researching current and past malware strategies has shown many possible areas of attack. A
computer on the Internet is exposed through many different interfaces. Any process that is monitoring
a port is susceptible to attack. The user's interactions with resources provided by others also opens up
many attack surfaces. Browsing the internet, reading e-mails and interacting with attachments,
downloading content from third party providers, executing downloaded content in potentially
vulnerable software, and exchanging physical storage mediums can lead to compromising the integrity
of the computer. In order to meet the needs of a constantly changing aggressive environment, a
security system based on verifying data before giving it full rights to execute should meet the following
criteria:
1. All attack surfaces should be secured. Any data that interacts with a system should be checked
before being given full privileges.
2. The system should be fully customizable. Security systems can fall behind because new attacks
and threats target areas that are not yet secured, or cannot be secured using current technology.
A customizable system should allow for the fact that new threats will be recognized that cannot
be sufficiently guarded against using old techniques.
3. The security system should be based on a modular design. This will allow for a customizable
system where new attack surfaces can be secured by creating a new module. In the event an
attack is created for a known interface that cannot be addressed by the current anti-malware
mechanisms, the anti-malware module for that interface can be updated to compensate for the
evolving attacks. A customizable modular design allows for the system to be adaptive.
4. The modular approach to verifying unknown data should be based on the attack surface of the
type of data. Instead of developing a security mechanism that governs all aspects of a computer
(such as signature scanning), focusing on the attack surface can allow for more specific defense
mechanisms. For example, installing a plug-in from an unknown web site should be treated
differently from securing network communications over an FTP port.
5. The needs of the user should be considered. A verification system will differ between a home
user and a corporate environment. The system should be scalable to meet the needs of different
users. Higher security levels with additional modules might be necessary for some users, while
others might only want a minimal level of security with the fewest modules possible.
6. There has to be room for error. In an ideal system, malware would be detected with a perfect
accuracy rate and no false positives. However, it is still possible that a user would want to
bypass security features to allow malware onto their system. In this event, there should be a
way to undo the harm the malware has caused. This allows for user and system errors.
7. General security practices should not be overlooked. Increased security can be gained by
creating a system that uses specialized security mechanisms based on the type of data and
interface. However, a general security system, such as a signature-based solution, can still be
built on top of this system to add an additional layer of security.
8. No security system can be implemented effectively without educating the user. User education
is as important as a good security system. If a user decides to use a security system in a manner
that is not intended, or ignore warnings, the computer system can still become compromised.
These criteria would allow for specific security systems based on the needs of the content and users it is
securing. More importantly, as new attack vectors are created due to expanding technologies, specific
security implementations can be added that do not negatively impact execution overhead. Each
security module is only executed for a particular interface, so every defensive strategy is not employed
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for a specific interface.
Securing Internet Browsing
One of the most difficult challenges is that vulnerabilities can be exploited through many
different attack surfaces. Of those attack surfaces, some can be exploited in vastly different ways, such
as Internet browsers. The SpyProxy project[6] offers an interesting approach to creating an
environment in which it is safe to browse the web. Due to the varying mechanisms a web page can
exploit a vulnerability in the user's computer (plugins, flash vulnerabilities, image vulnerabilities,
malformatted web pages, etc.), it is best suited to a sandbox technique. The SpyProxy project loaded
the questionable web page in a virtual environment, then browsed through the pages, installing any
requested software, and monitored for any malicious changes to the virtual environment. If anything
negatively impacted the virtual environment, access to the web page was denied. This strategy is
effective when it is difficult to develop a defense due to the large attack surface. In addition to
monitoring for trigger events, sensors[52] in the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) can be used to
increase the effectiveness of the sandbox. This would allow the web page to be loaded in an
environment where all interactions that the web page makes with the computer can be monitored at a
kernel level.
For purposes of browsing, it is not critical that the type of malware be identified. The
importance is effectively determining if it is safe to browse the website. Testing the web page in a
virtual environment does not identify what kind of malware is attacking the host, but can trigger alarms
if anything out of the ordinary is happening. If no alarms are triggered, the web page can be permitted
to load on the user's machine. Due to the sensitive nature of a web browser, and the difficulties in
creating efficient traps for all vulnerabilities, the web browser on the local machine can work within an
isolated execution environment[5] to add an additional layer of security. A lightweight virtualization of
the browsing environment, such as using the Featherweight Virtual Machine[3] (FVM), can yield a
more secure environment.
If the browser is isolated to its own virtualization environment, and the browser is
compromised, the virtualized environment for that session can be removed. Any data that is sent from
the Internet to the browser should be isolated within the virtualization environment so that any malware
is removed with the virtualized execution environment. In the event data needs to leave the isolated
environment in order to operate properly (such as downloading media to be played in a different
player), the data execution can be monitored with a system such as Manitou[1]. When data is passed
from the browsing environment to the base machine for purposes of sharing it across different
applications and processes, it can still not be fully trusted. To prevent malware from spreading in this
manner. a system like Manitou can allow it to execute with full privileges, including potentially
infecting the base machine. Once the infection has been detected, Manitou can revoke the execution
privileges of the malware. This does not remove it from the machine, but it does prevent it from doing
any further harm. From this point, the system can be restored back to a safe state by backtracking all of
the changes the monitored malware made.
Securing E-Mail
E-mail is difficult to secure for the same reasons as securing Internet browsing. When
attachments are taken in to consideration, the attack surface is very broad. A Trojan or worm that
spreads through e-mail attachments can take on the guise of any program. Due to the unpredictability
of attachments and links in phishing emails, the SpyProxy/FVM/Manitou[6][3][1] strategy for securing
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web browsing can be extended to e-mail. The functionality of e-mail and embedded content has
increased to the point where it is difficult to draw a distinct line between Internet browsing and emailing. Both can be associated with potentially malicious downloaded content that is hard to detect
without first executing it in a safe manner to determine exactly how your system will react. Using
SpyProxy/FVM/Manitou or like programs creates a safe execution environment to initially pass an
email through. The SpyProxy design can load the e-mail in a virtual environment identical to the host
computer where the e-mail will ultimately be received. If no alarms are triggered in this environment it
can pass to a virtualized execution environment on the host machine. If there is an attachment, it can
also be loaded and executed in a SpyProxy-type environment before passing it to the host machine.
This will allow for preliminary testing for obvious malicious behavior and fine-grain monitoring in a
controlled execution environment. If the attachment successfully moves through all of the layers of
security, the sender can be added to a white list. Instead of maintaining a black list that denies anyone
on the list, a white list can be maintained that reduces the security requirements for users on the list.
Attachments can still be monitored in a Manitou-like database so that execution privileges can be
removed if malware is detected from someone on the white list. All protections should not be removed
when someone is white listed to account for the possibility of a friendly user being compromised and
used to spread malware.
Securing Downloaded Content
Content that is downloaded from a third party resource, such as peer to peer media, can also
contain embedded malware. However, due to potentially large volumes of data and properties that can
be assumed, it is possible to efficiently rule out malware without using a system as large as a secondary
emulation environment that passes data to a primary emulation environment with controlled execution
monitoring. Downloaded content can be broken into two different categories: executable binaries and
data. Due to intrinsic differences, the two should be handled differently.
Executable binaries on a Windows platform can be parsed with a system like the Intelligent
Malware Detection System[10] (IMDS). This takes advantage of the fact that most executables follow
a well-known format. In addition to a known execution format, there is a distinct measurable
difference between malware and legitimate binaries. At some point, the malware has to change the
flow of execution, launch a new process, or modify an unusual location in memory in order to
compromise the system. By logging the execution instructions and comparing malware to legitimate
software, differences emerge that allow for accurate malware detection. In the event the software is
being downloaded to a particularly sensitive system, it is possible to limit program execution to an
isolated execution environment (such as the one offered with Solitude[5]). However, it should be
possible to sufficiently rule out the possibility of malware by parsing the execution instructions to
determine exactly how the executable will act on the system.
Non-executable data files have to be treated differently because it is more difficult to parse them
due to execution differences based on the intended application. To rule out immediate threats, the
methodology used in the Nepenthes[45] honeypot could be applied here. Instead of emulating the
entire application, the vulnerable portions could be emulated to see how the data file reacts. The
Nepenthes honeypot allows for the creation of vulnerability modules that act like a vulnerable service
and can be customized based on the needs of the user. A similar emulation technique could create an
environment that mimics a programs known vulnerabilities. The program could then begin the process
of loading the file into the emulated environment. If any traps are triggered during the load due to
vulnerabilities in the emulated environment, then it can be assumed that the data file is malicious. For
more complex programs, a different approach is possible. A local virtualization environment can be

45
used to monitor program execution with kernel level traps and event handlers such as those used to
monitor VMM sensors[52]. The application would be permitted to execute as normal, but kernel level
traps would be inserted that launch specific event handlers if something unusual occurs. These event
handlers can then check the current semantic view[2] of the machine to verify its integrity. If
something malicious is occurring, execution can be denied and the file can be considered malicious.
Securing Open Ports
Before looking at the processes monitoring each open port, it is important to establish which
ports should be opened and which ones should be closed. Any unnecessary ports and associated
processes or applications should be closed so that only mandatory ports are opened. At each needed
open port, an emulated process, such as those used in Nepenthes[45], can listen for network
connections. The emulated process can emulate the vulnerabilities of an unpatched or unprotected
service. If anything compromises the service, then that networked location can be considered
malicious and further communications can be denied for a predetermined amount of time.
If no vulnerabilities are abused, the network communications can be forwarded to an internal
process that would normally be monitoring the port. This would allow for full functionality and
vulnerability emulation. The “real” service can be nested within its own execution environment[3][5]
so that communication can be logged and monitored. Much like the previous execution environments,
sensors[52] can be placed in the isolated execution environment to ensure that no malicious behavior is
occurring. If the entire transaction completes in a safe manner, the remote location could be added to a
white list much like a trusted e-mail or Internet location so that security can be lowered for the next
transaction. Lowering the security level could mean letting the network communications start with the
real process instead of going through the emulated vulnerable process, but maintain execution in an
isolated environment where traps can still be triggered.
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Conclusion
Verifying data in a safe manner creates a more secure computing environment. Classically,
signature-based malware detection methods were used to scan for malware. These techniques were
initially successful due to the generalized use and construction of computers. As computers, and their
uses, have become more specialized, signature-based malware detection methods are not as useful. The
attack surface of a computer has expanded significantly since the advent of signature-based malware
detection methods. Web browsing, e-mail, networked computers, and networked software have created
many different attack surfaces. Using one general method to secure all of these, such as signaturebased malware detection, is becoming less reliable. The most successful computer security techniques
are those that attempt to secure specific attack surfaces[1][2][5][6], as opposed to general computer
security systems that hope to achieve security across all surfaces with the same method. To create a
reliable computer security system, unverified data should be thoroughly scrutinized before it is
permitted to access a computer. The data should be analyzed based on which attack surface it was
obtained from. For example, data obtained from web browsing should be verified differently than data
obtained from a peer-to-peer program. A computer security system that creates a defensive mechanism
based on each attack surface of a computer will yield a more reliable computing environment.
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Appendix A: An example of a sensor used to monitor a virtual machine. The first section of code
shows the trap used to trigger the event handler. The second section of code shows the event handler
that the trap calls. These two pieces of code make up a functioning sensor.[25]
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Appendix B: The number of Command and Control servers communicating on selected IRC ports.
The IRC Port is the port that the infect machine was listening on, the Number is the number of
Command and Control servers communicating over that particular port, and the Closed column
represents how many of those Command and Control servers are now inactive.[47]
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Appendix C: The process for determining if a packed executable is accessing dirty or clean memory.
The point where the flow of execution moves to a dirty regions represents the entry point to a new layer
that could be the unpacked portion of the malware.

